Tag Archives: Future

Ancestor Worship is Efficient

Maybe not “worship” exactly, but at least great respect and deference.  By “efficient” I mean that it increases economists’ standard “cost-benefit” concept of welfare.  That is: as usually estimated, the benefits of deferring greatly to distant ancestors far outweigh its costs.  And while this does suggest that we should defer more to ancestors, it also shows just how much distorted prices can break economists’ favorite tools.

The economic welfare of a proposed change is the benefits minus the costs of that change, translated into cash terms, though of course changes don’t have to actually be cash transactions.  When available, market prices are commonly accepted as estimates of the benefits and costs of things gained and lost.  Economic welfare is a powerful heuristic for finding win-win deals: in many kinds of situations, the strategy of consistently making the changes that increase economic welfare tends to be usefully close to an actual win-win deal that gives most everyone more of what they want.

The efficient ancestor worship problem arises from two key facts:

  1. Economic welfare cares not about giving people experiences but about satisfying their preferences, i.e., giving them what they want.  And even long dead people still have (or “had” if you prefer) preferences that we could now better satisfy.  If we do something a dead person would have wanted, that counts as a benefit.
  2. At standard market interest rates, the magic of compound interest quickly gives astronomical priority to the preferences of folks who lived long ago.  For example, in historical records near risk-free interest rates (e.g., land rents over prices) consistently exceeded 9%/yr from 3000BC to 1350AD, for a total factor of over 10162.

Together, these facts suggest we would increase economic welfare if we spent less than 10162 dollars today to do anything for which a 3000BC ancestor would have been willing to pay a dollar (equivalent in their currency).

Clearly we would quickly bankrupt ourselves if we tried to implement such “efficient” changes, and doing so would not be remotely close to a win-win deal with our ancestors.  What goes wrong here?

Our contract law system refuses to enforce many win-win deals between distant generations.  Many folks would be willing to create trusts that accumulated funds long after their death and then paid distant descendants (perhaps indirectly) to do things like remember their ancestor’s name, pray to his gods, etc.  Unless stolen, such funds would eventually come to dominate the world economy and dramatically lower interest rates.  With lower interest rates, economic efficiency would count the preferences of distant ancestors as far less valuable, and as a bonus businesses and governments would have far stronger incentives to attend to the interests of distant future folks, such as via global warming policies.

But we in fact refused to enforce a great many such long term deals.  For example:

The rule against perpetuities at common law … prevents a person from putting qualifications and criteria in his will that will continue to control or affect the distribution of assets long after he has died, a concept often referred to as control by the “dead hand.”

Our unthinkingly repugnance at being controlled by the dead, and our eagerness to grab their resources, prevents us from enforcing long-term win-win deals.  This refusal to enforce deals increases interest rates, which distorts all our trade-offs across time, bringing economic welfare estimates into stark conflict with intuitive moral judgments about time trades (as in global warming), which then encourages people to turn to non-economic frameworks for policy analysis.

When policy distorts prices, it distorts calculation of economic welfare, which encourages people to ignore economic welfare when choosing policy, which reduces their reluctance to intervene to further distort prices, which leads to a sad spiral of increasing confusion.  Please, let’s enforce long-term win-win deals!

Added: A fascinating alternate history might start from a year 1300 English legal precedent enabling flexible growing long term trusts.  By 1800 early trusts grew a billion-fold, and trusts dominate the economy.  What else changed?!

Parable of the Multiplier Hole

Imagine that we discovered a “hole in space”, through which we could see an alternate Earth, filled with people recognizably like us, though different in many ways.  Those people could also see us.

While no objects could move from their side of the hole to ours, small items (but not humans) could move from our side to theirs.  Furthermore, the hole had the amazing property of multiplying everything we sent through by a factor F of a million!  That is, if you tossed a gold coin through the hole, a million identical coins would come out the hole on the other side.

How tempted would you be to toss useful items, like food, through the hole?   Remember, the cost to you, relative to the benefit to them, is 1/F, only one part in a million.  When considering the following variations, and their various combinations, consider not only F = a million, but also ponder what fraction F would make you indifferent to tossing or not:

  1. Your gift goes to a random person on the other side.
  2. Your gift goes to a government on the other side, which controls the hole.
  3. You can specify to whom your gift will go, using some simple descriptors like “poor”, “smart” etc.
  4. We could also do other things to help them, such as by studying a problem of theirs and sending them a report with suggested solutions.  But these other actions don’t get multiplied by F; a million copies of the report doesn’t help more than one copy.
  5. The hole isn’t very reliable, and only one time in a thousand does what you toss through the hole actually get to the people on the other side.  But when the hole does work 1000*F items come out the other side.
  6. You have very good theoretical reasons to think that most likely there are people much like us on the other side of the hole, but you can’t actually see through the hole (though they can see us).

The point of this parable is that interest rates would also greatly leverage any gift you gave the distant future folks.  For example, in 1785 a French author wrote a satire about Ben Franlkin, the most famous American to Europeans.  While Franlkin was famous for his Poor Richard’s Almanac, the satire mocked American optimism by having “Fortunate Richard” leave money in his will to be invested for 500 years before being given to charity.

Franklin responded by leaving £1000 each to Philadelphia and Boston in his will to be invested for 200 years.   He died in 1790,  and by 1990 the funds had grown to 2.3, 5M$, giving factors of  35, 76 inflation-adjusted gains, for annual returns of 1.8, 2.2%.  Why has Franklin’s example inspired no copy-cats?  Does no one care to help distant future folks through the multiplier hole of compound interest?

Econ of Nano, AI

My January talk at Foresight 2010, Economics of Nanotech and AI, is now available: video, slides.  Seems I had a habit of messing my hair while talking.  Silly me.

Think Before Talk

A New Scientist editorial:

Should we try to promote contact by broadcasting our presence to the heavens? If alien civilisations exist, they are likely to be so far away that our message will not arrive until after we are gone. In that case, what is there to lose? We might as well let them know that we used to be around.  If, by chance, there are intelligent aliens within a few tens of light years from Earth, their own SETI programmes might already have sniffed us out. … So let’s make some friendly overtures, rather than leave them to wonder why we’re not transmitting, and what we’ve got to hide.

David Brin’s reply:

There is an arrogance in the transmission of these messages by small groups who have claimed the right to shout on behalf of Earth without consulting anybody else.  Many SETI researchers and others, including the editorial board of Nature, have asked for there to be a moratorium on these messages until broad international discussions can take place. …

That doesn’t seem much to ask, given the importance of the matter and our ignorance of the cosmos. … The message zealots label as paranoid anybody who wants open discussion. With their peremptory broadcasts, they bet our future on the assumption that all technological alien species will be altruistic. …

They deploy a host of blithe excuses, such as “aliens have already picked up our radio leakage” and “harm cannot span interstellar distances”, but they do not hold up under scientific scrutiny. … The history of first contacts between human cultures, and between previously isolated Earthly biomes, … make a sad litany that suggests patience, caution and lengthy discussion are in order before we make our presence known to the cosmos at large.

Brin seems obviously right here.  There may well be little chance anyone will hear our signals, but the main benefits of such signals are conditional on someone hearing, and so we should be concerned about large costs that also show up under exactly the same conditions.

There is clearly a real risk of market failure here; each broadcaster can enjoy the glory of hoping to be the special one to make first alien contact, while our whole planet suffers most of the consequences of that choice.  This sort of situation is exactly what global governance should be for.

Furthermore, the sort of complications that bedevil coordination on global warming, estimating each nation’s costs of warming and contribution to cooling, are avoided here – this conflict is just the one broadcaster vs. the rest of the world.  (Regulations to limit unintentional signals, as in telecom or planetary radar science, move more in that bedeviling direction.)  Our failure to actually achieve any global coordination here shows just how weak are such abilities –  a slight air of “silly topic” is all it takes to completely block coordination.

As Brin notes, many would-be broadcasters come from an academic area where for decades the standard assumption has been that aliens are peaceful zero-population-growth no-nuke greens, since we all know that any other sort quickly destroy themselves.  This seems to me an instructive example of how badly a supposed “deep theory” inside-view of the future can fail, relative to closest-related-track-record outside-view.  As Brin says, the track record of contact between cultures, species, and biomes is not especially encouraging, and it is far too easy for far-view minds to overestimate the reliability of theoretical arguments to the contrary.

One Book To Save Them

William Grassie has a fuzzy-headed far view on surviving catastrophe:

Imagine a major planetary catastrophe, … something in the order of the Mt. Toba supervolcano … some 73,000 years ago. … Humanity was reduced to some 1000-to-10,000 breeding pairs. … One of the thirty or so supervolcanos … is the Yellowstone Basin. … The United States disappears in the course of a few days. … The survivors would be reduced to subsistence farming, gathering, hunting, and fishing in areas around the earth’s equator. … Let’s say that humanity is again reduced to some 10,000 breeding pairs. …

What knowledge from today would be most valuable to these survivors as they tried to rebuild their lives and repopulate the earth? … You get to choose one book. …  Stockpiling food and weapons in the mountains of Idaho would be a silly and small-minded emergency plan. … Instead of focusing on the survival of my tribe, my family, or myself, we need to focus on the survival of civilization. ….  And the only way to do this with assurance is to distribute the most valuable and practical knowledge as widely as possible across the planet today in anticipation that unfortunate day. …

The book I would chose is Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History. … It is the combined history of the universe, our creative planet, and our restless species. …. Catastrophic collapses, however, are part of the big story. … Civilizations do not last forever. Farmlands become deleted. … Continue Reading "One Book To Save Them" »

Is The City-ularity Near?

The land around New York City is worth a lot.  A 2008 analysis estimated prices for land, not counting buildings etc., for most (~80%?) of the nearby area (2750 square miles, = a 52 mile square).  The total New York area land value (total land times ave price) was 5.5T$ (trillion) in 2002 and 28T$ in 2006.

The Economist said that in 2002 all developed nation real estate was worth 62T$.  Since raw land value is on average about a third of total real estate value, that puts New York area real estate at over 30% of all developed nation real estate in 2002!  Whatever the exact number, clearly this agglomeration contains vast value.

New York land is valuable mainly because of how it is organized.  People want to be there because they want to interact with other people they expect to be there, and they expect those interactions to be quite mutually beneficial.  If you could take any other 50 mile square (of which Earth has 72,000), and create that same expectation of mutual value from interactions, you could get people to come there, make buildings, etc., and sell that land for many trillions of dollars of profit.

Yet the organization of New York was mostly set long ago based on old tech (e.g., horses, cars, typewriters).  Worse, no one really understands at a deep level how it is organized or why that works so well.  Different people understand different parts, in mostly crude empirical ways.

So what will happen when super-duper smarties wrinkle their brows so hard that out pops a deep math theory of cities, explaining clearly how city value is produced?  What if they apply their theory to designing a city structure that takes best advantage of our most advanced techs, of 7gen phones, twitter-pedias, flying Segways, solar panels, gene-mod pigeons, and super-fluffy cupcakes?  Making each city aspect more efficient makes the city more attractive, increasing the gains from making other aspects more efficient, in a grand spiral of bigger gains.

Once they convince the world of the vast value in their super-stupendous city design, won’t everyone flock there and pay mucho trillions for the privilege? Couldn’t they leverage this lead into better theories enabling better designs giving far more trillions, and then spend all that on a super-designed war machine based on those same super insights, and turn us all into down dour super-slaves?  So isn’t the very mostest importantest cause ever to make sure that we, the friendly freedom fighters, find this super deep city theory first?

Well, no, it isn’t.  We don’t believe in a city-ularity because we don’t believe in a super-city theory found in a big brain flash of insight.  What makes cities work well is mostly getting lots of details right.  Sure new-tech-based cities designs can work better, but gradual tech gains mean no city is suddenly vastly better than others.  Each change has costs to be weighed against hoped-for gains.  Sure costs of change might be lower when making a whole new city from scratch, but for that to work you have to be damn sure you know which changes are actually good ideas.

For similar reasons, I’m skeptical of a blank-slate AI mind-design singularity.  Sure if there were a super mind theory that allowed vast mental efficiency gains all at once, but there isn’t.  Minds are vast complex structures full of parts that depend intricately on each other, much like the citizens of a city.  Minds, like cities, best improve gradually, because you just never know enough to manage a vast redesign of something with such complex inter-dependent adaptations.

Dreamtime Drama

After a record two feet of snow this weekend, my area (DC) has another 5-9 inches coming tomorrow.  My street hasn’t been plowed, and likely won’t be until next week.  So this might seem one of those “stories to tell your grandkids.”  Except, well, we have water, power, heat, tv, internet, plenty of food, and no more than the usual work to do.  Not exactly a disaster story for the ages.

This is of course one of the prices we pay for being dreamtime richies – stories about our suffering just aren’t going to elicit much sympathy from our distant descendants.  We can hardly get worked up about them ourselves.  The far future may, however, be fascinated to gawk at our freaky facades, ginormous growth, strange scenarios, and bizarre beliefs.  We are history’s circus; which circus wonder are you?

The Future of Sex

Our descendants will be different from us. In a competitive world, they’ll have to be; our design is hardly optimized for their world. But since they will evolve incrementally from us, they won’t be completely different.  For example, many features of the ways we talk between minds, and within minds, may lock in as interface standards.  Also, our descendants will prefer to reuse and modify complex workable modules rather than reinventing such things from scratch.

Which brings us to everyone’s favorite topic: sex. Our minds have been evolved in great detail to handle human sex. How might our descendants reuse and adapt those well-honed capabilities to deal with future mental challenges?

First, it is pretty obvious that within a century or two at most our descendants just won’t be creating descendants by randomly mixing the features of two parents, any more than firms today design new products via random mixes of old product features. No, our descendants will be more deliberately designed, with design components inspired by, if not directly taken from, a great many predecessors.  They just won’t make babies the bio-sex way.

Even so, our distant descendants will continue to form long-term alliances between minds whose qualities and loyalties are opaque. Even when one can directly peer inside, most complex minds simply have no clear place to look to see their overall abilities and loyalties. Such features are instead spread across such minds and best seen in actual behavior.  So to infer such features it can help to probe and test such minds in particular ways.  Our mental sexual toolkit is full of such ways to probe and test.

Also, when complex minds last longer than the multi-mind tasks they tackle, they must choose which minds combine to do which tasks.  And to create good incentives, minds must share some consequences of their joint performance, while committing in certain ways to outcomes they might not prefer after the fact.  Our sexual toolkit also has many useful ways to deal with these issues.

Our descendants will therefore likely recruit variations on our sexual toolkit to such tasks.   They will distinguish flings from “true love” while adapting human feelings of lust, romance, attachment, jealousy, and intimacy, and also variations on our mating dances of watching, displaying, flirting, wooing, testing, seducing, accusing, betraying, etc.

Our descendants may also distinguish male from female patterns of such behaviors. For example, some will pursue while others evaluate, some will take more risks while others play it safer, some will invest more vs. less in each relation, and some will protect against outside dangers while others nurture inside growth.

Our mental adaptations to sex are subtle and well-tuned for our mating task of slowly teasing out the abilities and intentions of others while becoming increasingly committed to and dependent on those others.  Our distant descendants will likely adapt such abilities for their many purposes.  Future sex may well change greatly to meet future needs, but it will still be recognizably sex all the same.  Long live sex!

Come The Em Rev

China on Friday unveiled a shake-up of the way land is seized for redevelopment. … Land seizures over the past decade have been central to the rapid modernization of hundreds of Chinese cities, which in turn has been one of the main drivers of the nation’s economic growth. But they also have been the source of often-violent conflicts, especially in the past year, as huge volumes of stimulus funds have gone into building projects.  Post

Rich stable nations, comfortable and safe on top of the global game, feel little inclination to consider big disruptive changes.  The price they pay for internal peace is the steady accumulation of Olsonian veto groups, who can block big changes.  Stable inflexible institutions seem acceptable when change is slow and life seem good enough.

This frustrates rich-nation would-be-rebels like me who see our business, legal, political, etc. institutions as far from optimal.  Such rebels want to explore big changes, but must either: 1) accept only tinkering around the edges, 2) move to a place more willing to make changes, or 3) wait for crises where larger changes might fly.

So what crises loom?  In the US we can expect the long foreseen budget “train wreck” within a decade or two.  This must be addressed by huge tax increases, spending decreases, or both.  Foresighted politicians are positioning their blame and solutions for that crisis.  Since we spend so much on military and medical benefits, I’ve wondered if we’ll consider “Med is a waste, cut it way back” or “Let the world defend itself, cut our military.” Alas, neither seems likely.

In two to five decades, the US will probably start to take seriously global competition from big fast growing nations like China or India.  The US might then consider adopting policies credited with growing those nations fast, though national pride may block that.  Foresighted advocates will position their credit and solutions for that crisis.

But if you lust after huge institutional change in long-rich nations, if you long to say “come the revolution,” you might wait three to fifteen decades for the “em rev“, the whole brain emulation revolution.  The em rev is my best guess for the next “singularity” scale change, like the farming or industrial revolutions, each of which sped world growth rates by more than a factor of a hundred, within less than a previous doubling time.  We now double in fifteen years, so within a few years an em-econ could double monthly! Continue Reading "Come The Em Rev" »

AI In Far And Near View

Looking far into the distance, your eyes often see a sharp boundary between earth and sky. But if you were to travel to that furthest part of earth your eye can now see, you may not find a sharp boundary there.  Far mode simplifies, not only suppressing detail, but making you think detail is unimportant.  If you saw two ships battling on the horizon, you’d be too tempted to expect the bigger ship to win.

From a distance, future techs also seem overly simple and hence disruptive.  If in 1672 you had seen Verbiest’s steam-powered vehicle, you might have imagined that the first nation with cheap capable cars could conquer the world.  After all, they might build tanks and troop transports, and literally run circles around enemy troops.  But while having somewhat better cars did sometimes help some nations, it was far from an overwhelming advantage. Cars slowly gained in cost, ability, and number; there was no particular day when one nation had vastly more capable cars.

Similar scenarios have played out for a great many techs, like rockets, radios, lasers, or computers.  While one might imagine from afar that the difference between none of a tech and a “full” version would give a dramatic advantage, actual progress was more incremental, reducing team differences in tech levels.  Overall differences in wealth and tech capability were usually better explanations for the advantages some nations had over others.

The first far images of nanotech were also simple, stark, and disruptive.  They imagined one team could quickly and reliably assemble, from cheap plentiful feedstocks, large quantities of a large set of big atom arrangements, while other teams had near-current capabilities.  In this scenario, the first first team might well conquer the world, or accidentally destroy it via “grey goo.”

The nanotech transition seems less disruptive, however, if we see more detail, and imagine a series of incrementally more capable assemblers, able to build larger objects, faster, more reliably, from more types of feedstocks, using more kinds of local chemical bonds, at a wider range of assembler-assembled angles, and so on.  After all, we already have ribosome assemblers, with a very limited range of feeds, bonds, angles, etc.  Each new type of assembler would lower the cost of making a new class of objects.

Far images of artificial intelligence (AI) can also be overly stark.  If you saw minds as having a single relevant ”intelligence” parameter, with humans unable but machines able to change their parameter, you might well rue the day a machine whizzed past the human level.  Especially if you thought God-levels might follow a month later, and if you thought this parameter’s typical value was what determined a team’s power. Continue Reading "AI In Far And Near View" »