Tag Archives: Finance

Ancestor Worship is Efficient

Maybe not “worship” exactly, but at least great respect and deference.  By “efficient” I mean that it increases economists’ standard “cost-benefit” concept of welfare.  That is: as usually estimated, the benefits of deferring greatly to distant ancestors far outweigh its costs.  And while this does suggest that we should defer more to ancestors, it also shows just how much distorted prices can break economists’ favorite tools.

The economic welfare of a proposed change is the benefits minus the costs of that change, translated into cash terms, though of course changes don’t have to actually be cash transactions.  When available, market prices are commonly accepted as estimates of the benefits and costs of things gained and lost.  Economic welfare is a powerful heuristic for finding win-win deals: in many kinds of situations, the strategy of consistently making the changes that increase economic welfare tends to be usefully close to an actual win-win deal that gives most everyone more of what they want.

The efficient ancestor worship problem arises from two key facts:

  1. Economic welfare cares not about giving people experiences but about satisfying their preferences, i.e., giving them what they want.  And even long dead people still have (or “had” if you prefer) preferences that we could now better satisfy.  If we do something a dead person would have wanted, that counts as a benefit.
  2. At standard market interest rates, the magic of compound interest quickly gives astronomical priority to the preferences of folks who lived long ago.  For example, in historical records near risk-free interest rates (e.g., land rents over prices) consistently exceeded 9%/yr from 3000BC to 1350AD, for a total factor of over 10162.

Together, these facts suggest we would increase economic welfare if we spent less than 10162 dollars today to do anything for which a 3000BC ancestor would have been willing to pay a dollar (equivalent in their currency).

Clearly we would quickly bankrupt ourselves if we tried to implement such “efficient” changes, and doing so would not be remotely close to a win-win deal with our ancestors.  What goes wrong here?

Our contract law system refuses to enforce many win-win deals between distant generations.  Many folks would be willing to create trusts that accumulated funds long after their death and then paid distant descendants (perhaps indirectly) to do things like remember their ancestor’s name, pray to his gods, etc.  Unless stolen, such funds would eventually come to dominate the world economy and dramatically lower interest rates.  With lower interest rates, economic efficiency would count the preferences of distant ancestors as far less valuable, and as a bonus businesses and governments would have far stronger incentives to attend to the interests of distant future folks, such as via global warming policies.

But we in fact refused to enforce a great many such long term deals.  For example:

The rule against perpetuities at common law … prevents a person from putting qualifications and criteria in his will that will continue to control or affect the distribution of assets long after he has died, a concept often referred to as control by the “dead hand.”

Our unthinkingly repugnance at being controlled by the dead, and our eagerness to grab their resources, prevents us from enforcing long-term win-win deals.  This refusal to enforce deals increases interest rates, which distorts all our trade-offs across time, bringing economic welfare estimates into stark conflict with intuitive moral judgments about time trades (as in global warming), which then encourages people to turn to non-economic frameworks for policy analysis.

When policy distorts prices, it distorts calculation of economic welfare, which encourages people to ignore economic welfare when choosing policy, which reduces their reluctance to intervene to further distort prices, which leads to a sad spiral of increasing confusion.  Please, let’s enforce long-term win-win deals!

Added: A fascinating alternate history might start from a year 1300 English legal precedent enabling flexible growing long term trusts.  By 1800 early trusts grew a billion-fold, and trusts dominate the economy.  What else changed?!

Parable of the Multiplier Hole

Imagine that we discovered a “hole in space”, through which we could see an alternate Earth, filled with people recognizably like us, though different in many ways.  Those people could also see us.

While no objects could move from their side of the hole to ours, small items (but not humans) could move from our side to theirs.  Furthermore, the hole had the amazing property of multiplying everything we sent through by a factor F of a million!  That is, if you tossed a gold coin through the hole, a million identical coins would come out the hole on the other side.

How tempted would you be to toss useful items, like food, through the hole?   Remember, the cost to you, relative to the benefit to them, is 1/F, only one part in a million.  When considering the following variations, and their various combinations, consider not only F = a million, but also ponder what fraction F would make you indifferent to tossing or not:

  1. Your gift goes to a random person on the other side.
  2. Your gift goes to a government on the other side, which controls the hole.
  3. You can specify to whom your gift will go, using some simple descriptors like “poor”, “smart” etc.
  4. We could also do other things to help them, such as by studying a problem of theirs and sending them a report with suggested solutions.  But these other actions don’t get multiplied by F; a million copies of the report doesn’t help more than one copy.
  5. The hole isn’t very reliable, and only one time in a thousand does what you toss through the hole actually get to the people on the other side.  But when the hole does work 1000*F items come out the other side.
  6. You have very good theoretical reasons to think that most likely there are people much like us on the other side of the hole, but you can’t actually see through the hole (though they can see us).

The point of this parable is that interest rates would also greatly leverage any gift you gave the distant future folks.  For example, in 1785 a French author wrote a satire about Ben Franlkin, the most famous American to Europeans.  While Franlkin was famous for his Poor Richard’s Almanac, the satire mocked American optimism by having “Fortunate Richard” leave money in his will to be invested for 500 years before being given to charity.

Franklin responded by leaving £1000 each to Philadelphia and Boston in his will to be invested for 200 years.   He died in 1790,  and by 1990 the funds had grown to 2.3, 5M$, giving factors of  35, 76 inflation-adjusted gains, for annual returns of 1.8, 2.2%.  Why has Franklin’s example inspired no copy-cats?  Does no one care to help distant future folks through the multiplier hole of compound interest?

Hard Facts: Incentives

More wisdom from Hard Facts:

We … [did] research to discover if courteous clerks fueled sales.  … We ultimately found little if any evidence that courtesy increased store sales. …The main finding … was that clerks in stores with more sales were actually less courteous.  Apparently, the crowding and long lines in busy stores make clerks and customers grouchy. (p.39)

A survey of more than 200 human resource professionals from companies employing more than 2500 people … found that even though more than half of the companies used forced rankings, the respondents reported that forced ranking resulted in lower productivity, inequity and skepticism, negative effects on employee engagement, reduced collaboration, and damage to morale and mistrust in leadership. (p.107)

Individuals believe that others are motivated by money, even as they know that they are much less so. … A survey … of almost 500 prospective lawyers … revealed that 64 percent … said they were pursuing a legal career because it was intellectually appealing or because they were interested in the law, but only 12 percent thought their peers were similarly motivated.  Instead 62 percent thought that others were pursuing a legal career for the financial rewards. (p.115)

A survey of 205 executives from diverse industries found that 68 percent reported their companies had executive bonus plans because senior management believed tthat such plans would motivate executives.  These same executives reported, however, that they did not make daily business decisions based on how such decisions would affect either their bonus or those of other people. (p.116)

Students who are in school or who have chosen a major for instrumental reasons – in order to get a better job or to make more money – are much more likely to cheat than students who have chosen a course of study because of their interest in in the subject matter.  (p.124)

Great Depression

Conventional wisdom tends to treat President Hoover as a clueless advocate of laissez faire who refused to stimulate the economy in the dramatic downturn. Franklin Roosevelt, on the other hand, was the heroic leader who both saved the day and transformed the American economy through his promotion of the New Deal. …

There is little corroboration in the historical record for this simplistic storyline. … Most of what both Presidents did in fiscal policy had little impact on the Depression one way or another. … The consensus view is that FDR’s [main] policy success was the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933.

Though there is still a lively popular debate about the “true” cause of the Great Depression, there is nonetheless a strong expert consensus … The Fed’s focus on curbing speculation in the stock market by restricting lending—as well as its unwillingness to extend liquidity and expand the money supply in the face of a collapsing economy and a wave of bank panics in the early 1930s—deeply aggravated the severity and extent of the downturn.

That is John Nye.  Read and learn.

Hard Facts: Mergers

Back in December Nancy Lebovitz commented here that the book Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths And Total Nonsense: Profiting From Evidence-Based Management “may be may be of interest to any contrarian”  She is quite right.  So much so that I will do a series of posts quoting from it. Here is Hard Facts on mergers:

Study after study shows that most mergers – some estimates are 70 percent or more – fail to deliver their intended benefits and destroy economic value in the process.  A recent analysis of 93 studies covering more than 200,000 mergers published in peer-reviewed journals showed that, on average, the negative effects of a merger on shareholder value become evident less than a month after a merger is announced and persist thereafter. …

More thoughtful leaders might do what Cisco Systems has done – figure out the factors associated with successful and unsuccessful mergers and then actually use those insights to guide behavior.  … A Fortune article on bad mergers noted that “infrastructure giant Cisco has digested 57 companies without heartburn.” … Cisco figured out that mergers between similar sized companies rarely work, as there are frequently struggles about which team will control the combined entity.  … Cisco’s leaders also determined that mergers work best when companies are geographically proximate, making integration and collaboration much easier. … and they also uncovered the importance of organizational cultural compatibility for merger success.  …

You might think that companies would learn from all this experience … you would be wrong.  Business decisions … are frequently based on hope or fear, what others seem to be doing, what senior leaders have done and believe has worked in the past, and their dearly held ideologies – in short on lots of things other than the facts. (pp. 4,5)

Big Bad News Ban

We’d love for things to go well.  So we’d love people to think that things are going well.  So we want folks to hear news about how things are going well.  But sometimes people hear bad news, about how things are going bad.  Gee – why don’t we fix this by banning bad news?  Then people will only hear good things, and so only good things will happen, right?

This argument is transparently stupid to most everyone, at least when they think of “bad news” as appearing in newspapers or TV shows.  Sadly, that insight seems to disappear when it comes to financial bad news communicated via short sales.  Making for this bad news:

The [US] Securities and Exchange Commission enacted new restrictions on short selling on Wednesday aimed at restoring investor confidence by preventing speculators from pouncing on stocks already in a tailspin.

The rules, which were approved in a 3 to 2 party-line vote, come as the agency has faced intense pressure from lawmakers and investors to crack down on the practice, which some on Wall Street have blamed for crashing the stock values of major financial companies during the 2008 market crisis. …

The new restrictions, which will take eight months to put into effect, only affect stocks that have declined at least 10 percent since the previous day. At that point, short sellers essentially will have to pay a small premium to bet against a stock.

Anyone who believes that stocks which have fallen at least 10% in a day are an unappreciated good buy are free to grab that free money they think is lying on the sidewalk.  Clearly most folks don’t do this, and so don’t believe this, implying that short sales that push stock prices down on average give reliable bad news: this stock is worse than you thought.

Taxing short sales is an attempt to ban this bad news, to trick people into thinking those companies are doing better than they are.  After all, we all know that the financial crisis was not caused by banks making bad loans, it was caused by short sellers telling people that banks had made bad loans — if only we’d killed the messenger, we wouldn’t be in this mess, right?

Related posts.

Added 9p: A “self-fulfilling bad news” argument can apply to restaurant or movie reviews as well.  In fact, they can apply to most bad news.  For example, if a review says a restaurant is bad, fewer people go there, so they replace their expensive good chef with a cheap bad one, etc.  So should we band negative restaurant reviews?  Should we ban all bad news?

Who Manages Best

ManageRate

10 conclusions of an excellent analysis of firm management:

  1. Firms with “better” management practices tend to have better performance on a wide range of dimensions: they are larger, more productive, grow faster, and have higher survival rates.
  2. Management practices vary tremendously across firms and countries. Most of the difference in the average management score of a country is due to the size of the “long tail” of very badly managed firms. For example, relatively few U.S. firms are very badly managed, while Brazil and India have many firms in that category.
  3. Countries and firms specialize in different styles of management. For example, American firms score much higher than Swedish firms in incentives but are worse than Swedish firms in monitoring.
  4. Strong product market competition appears to boost average management practices through a combination of eliminating the tail of badly managed firms and pushing incumbents to improve their practices.
  5. Multinationals are generally well managed in every country. They also transplant their management styles abroad. For example, U.S. multinationals located in the United Kingdom are better at incentives and worse at monitoring than Swedish multinationals in the United Kingdom.
  6. Firms that export (but do not produce) overseas are better-managed than domestic non-exporters, but are worse-managed than multinationals.
  7. Inherited family-owned firms who appoint a family member (especially the eldest son) as chief executive officer are very badly managed on average.
  8. Government-owned firms are typically managed extremely badly. Firms with publicly quoted share prices or owned by private-equity firms are typically well managed.
  9. Firms that more intensively use human capital, as measured by more educated workers, tend to have much better management practices.
  10. At the country level, a relatively light touch in labor market regulation is associated with better use of incentives by management.

It seems US firms have a bright future, and that China and India grow fast in spite of, not because of, their managers.

Tax Bank Collapse Risk?

A week ago I said:

The main general approaches I know [to avoid total collapse] are refuges, to directly protect against the worst case, and the robustness rewards above, which counter-act known problems that distort our world economy toward fragility.

I suggested fixing current biases in intellectual property, empire bias, crisis metrics, and missing standards.  Here is a finance regulation proposal in the same spirit:

The Obama proposal for bank taxation has simple flat rates on uninsured bank liabilities. This is a better target than total liabilities since deposits were already insured, and the intervention bailed out wholesale funding.  But is such a flat tax designed to control risk creation? John Kay (2010) argues against it. Meanwhile Viral Acharya and Mathew Richardson (2010) argue that the bailouts have generated more moral hazard and suggest a fee discouraging all activity that creates systemic risk – not just leverage – and moreover that banks should be paying more in the good times when risk taking is more attractive.

In recent research, Javier Suarez and I (2009a, b) suggested a more subtle policy than President Obama’s – a Pigouvian tax based on banks’ individual contribution to systemic-risk creation, measured by their exposure to uninsured short-term funding. As in the Obama tax, this approach exempts insured deposits and targets the risk of sudden withdrawals of wholesale funding, which was the engine of the last crisis. Critically, our tax is sharper for shorter-term funding and decreases to zero for medium-term liabilities that do bear risk. In other words, it targets the externality caused by funding fragility and offers strong incentive effects in good times.

I’m not a banking or macro expert, and there is clearly a danger of fighting the last war here, but at least this seems focused on the right sort of problem.  HT Rob Wiblin.

Capital In Conflict

Until a few centuries ago economic growth rates were well below feasible population growth rates.  This gave a “Malthusian” state, as in most animal species, where population was near its max sustainable level.  To learn more about our distant future, which will probably be in such a state, let us learn more about our Malthusian past.  In particular, consider two important clues:

  1. Slack – As measured either by kids per mom or hours of work a day, most recent pre-industrial societies were ~30-70% below their simple Malthusian limit.
  2. Interest – Even after correcting for depreciation and failure-to-pay, for many thousands of years interest rates have been far above population growth rates.

(Data on both clues in Greg Clark’s Farewell to Alms.)

The slack clue can be explained via local cultural norms (i.e., signaling equilibria).  For example, pre-industrial English women married at ~26; those who married earlier had more kids, but at the cost of lower husband quality and threatened kid survival.  In societies with low work hour norms, harder workers faced ridicule and theft.  They attracted worse spouses and couldn’t use all their extra product to feed more kids.

Since social norms varied greatly across societies, however, it is puzzling that competition between neighboring societies didn’t favor societies with norms that put them closer to the Malthusian limit.  When neighboring groups clashed, why didn’t those with norms favoring denser populations tend to win out?

Interest rates appear in prices for renting land, borrowing silver, etc.  Social norm variety also makes high interest rates puzzling.  Local subgroups with a norm of saving capital and reinvesting as much as possible should in principle quickly outgrown groups who instead borrowed, rented, etc.  Soon even a small fraction of the interest on their wealth could paid for many more kids.

We can explain each of these puzzles by assuming that labor and capital have a different value relative to labor in conflicts, relative to more directly making food etc.  However these two explanations are somewhat at odds.

On the slack clue, cultures that limited their fertility and work hours should have had more capital per person.  In conflicts with neighboring cultures, perhaps low capital cultures were more often intimidated or seduced by folks from individually-richer high capital cultures.  Or perhaps such capital was especially useful in warfare.

On the interest clue, subgroups in a society who accumulated more wealth, relative to other groups, would end up with more capital relative to labor than other subgroups.  Other groups would then be tempted to steal that capital.  Perhaps labor is just especially useful in stealing capital, while capital is especially easy to steal relative to labor, especially given very large capital to labor ratios.  Perhaps this Biblical rule was to limit harm from predictable periodic predation:

The Jubilee year … required the compulsory return of all property to its original owners or their heirs, except the houses of laymen within walled cities, in addition to the manumission of all Israelite indentured servants.

Problem is, these two explanations are somewhat at odds – the first assumes that capital is especially strong, relative to labor, in conflicts with neighboring societies, while the second assumes that capital is especially weak, relative to labor, in conflicts within a society.  Can both really be true?

Risk Rating Reluctance

Managers of many financial organizations are arguably tempted to take too much risk with organizational investments.  Reputation-wise, such managers often gain more from stellar investments than they lose from disastrous ones.  Many regulations try to address this problem by limiting such organizations to “safe” investments, as determined by a few official ratings agencies.  This creates a demand by such managers for assets that are actually risky, but which are officially rated as safe.

Apparently the recent financial crisis was due in part to those official risk rating agencies supplying this demand; they are private firms and profited from applying too little skepticism to whether certain key assets really were as safe as some claimed.  No doubt those agencies say that this was all a terrible accident, that they never intended to profit from mistakenly calling risky things safe, but since they seem to have suffered little from the harm they assisted in creating for others, I have my doubts.

In all the financial reform discussions, I haven’t heard any proposals to address this specific problem.  And I’ve always wondered why we need investment ratings agencies anyway.  In principle, the right financial assets can give any elements you like from a full joint probability distribution over asset returns; how could a ratings agency expect to do consistently better?

At lunch today I asked my wise colleague Garett Jones about this, and he suggested that big financial orgs like being rated by people they can pressure. If they don’t like a rating, they can work their elite-school-alum networks of contacts to apply pressure to the ratings agencies to change unwanted ratings.  Such pressure is much less effective on financial market prices.  Garett also pointed me to this passage of his:

[Remember] the debate over subordinated debt in the early 2000’s, surveyed in Stern and Feldman’s Too Big to Fail. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial reform bill attempted to create a class of subordinated debt that would be explicitly banned from any future bailouts.  Major financial institutions would have been be required to hold some portion of their liabilities in the form of subordinated debt in order to give financial markets and regulators alike a market-based measure of firm health: If yields on a major firm’s subordinated debt spiked, that would be a warning sign.  But financial institutions and the Federal Reserve Board both pushed back against this market-based indicator, and so the subordinated debt requirement never made it through the regulatory process. … Firms will resist issuing debt that is bailout-free, and will overwhelmingly prefer debt that is bailout-qualified.

Bailouts mess up the connection between asset prices and their inherent risks.  Ordinarily, market prices only tell you the chance that a debt will be paid, not whether it would have been paid without a bailout.

This is all moderately bad news for prediction markets in such firms.  Apparently well-connected managers already know they prefer estimates by officials who respond to social pressure, over hard-to-manipulate market estimates, even if the later are more accurate.  Of course less well-connected managers should prefer the opposite, but who wants to signal their bad connections by endorsing independent markets?

Added 8a: Unnamed points us to Matt Yglesias responding in Sept. to Kevin Drum and an August Policy Report by Mark Calabria.  Kevin says:

Over the past decade ratings agencies were, at best, negligent, and at worst, perpetrators of outright fraud.

but doesn’t think raters were a big problem because other orgs used similar risk models and both buyers and sellers liked the mis-labeling.  Yet this is just what a corrupted regulator model predicts.  These folks consider switching who pays the raters, or making them a direct government agency, but not replacing them with direct market price risk estimates – why so blind to such an obvious solution?