Tag Archives: Ems

News of What?

Today’s New York Times has a 7000 word article by Amy Harmon on cryonics, brain scanning, and brain emulation. Now these are subjects of great interest to me; my first book comes out in spring on the third topic. And 7000 words is space to say a great deal, even if you add the constraint that what you say must be understandable to the typical NYT reader.

So I’m struck by the fact that I have almost nothing to say in response to anything particular said in this article. Ms. Harmon gives the most space to one particular young cryonics patient who got others to donate to pay for her freezing. This patient hopes to return via brain emulation. Ms. Harmon discusses some history of the Brain Preservation Prize, highlighting Ken Hayworth personally, and quotes a few experts saying we are nowhere close to being able to emulate brains. At one point she says,

The questions the couple faced may ultimately confront more of us with implications that could be preposterously profound.

Yet she discusses no such implications. She discusses no arguments on if emulation would be feasible or desirable or what implications it might have. I’ll give her the benefit of the doubt and presume that her priorities accurately reflect the priorities of New York Times readers. But those priorities are so different from mine as to highlight the question: what exactly do news readers want?

For a topic like this, it seems readers want colorful characters described in detail, and quotes from experts with related prestige. They don’t want to hear about arguments for or against the claims made, or to discuss further implications of those claims. It seems they will enjoy talking to others about the colorful characters described, and perhaps enjoy taking a position on the claims those characters make. But these aren’t the sort of topics where anyone expects to care about the quality or care of the arguments one might. It is enough to just have opinions.

Added 14Sep: Amy posted a related article that is a technical review of brain emulation tech. I’m glad it exists, but I also have nothing particular to say in response.

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The Ghosts Of Em

Our basic concept of “death” is binary, so that one is either dead or not. But we often metaphorically extend the concept to a continuum. For example, people who have more strength, energy, passion, and awareness are said to be “more alive,” and those who have more power, prestige, influence, or wealth are also said to be “more” in many ways, including more central and alive. Since sleepers have less of all of these things, sleep is often seen as a partial death.

We have a related mythical concept of “ghost,” which is also sometimes made into a continuum of ghostliness. A ghost was once human, but then died, and now is an active agent with death-related features. So ghosts tend to be cold, sick, in low mood, and have a weak influence on the physical world. They are typically distracted, unaware of, and disinterested in humans. Ghosts are anti-social, avoid groups of more than a few humans, and don’t collect into ghost gangs or ghost cities. They are reluctant to move away from their old haunts, and remain obsessed with old issues. Ghosts are heard more than seen, rarely speak words, and are seen more in unusual viewing modes such as night, shadows, and mirrors.

Slow em retirees share many features with people we see as “less alive,” including ghosts. Not only are they literally closer subjectively to dying soon due to civilization instability, their minds are also more inflexible and stuck in their ways. Compared to faster working ems, slow retirees have less awareness, wealth, status, and influence, and they are slower to respond to events, including via speaking words or coordinating with others. Retirees may often watch and judge working ems, and in such roles may only be visible only in special views.

Thus ems may come to see slower ems as ghostly, and more ghostly when slower. Such em ghosts are real, and with trouble one can talk to them, but like ghosts they aren’t very useful as allies, they sometimes hurt people they interact with, and so since one is usually free to ignore them, that is usually the wise strategy. Since ems must pay for faster speeds, for ems being more alive is more directly related to having more money to spend.

If “beneath” each em are many layers of a ghostly underworld, just how deep does this abyss go? Katja Grace at AI Impacts just helped me out by estimating the ratio of costs, using today’s technology, to store a brain state and to run a human-speed brain emulation. This ratio equals the “base” em speed as a fraction of human speed. This is near the lowest reasonable speed for ems, since well above it cost is proportional to speed, and well below it cost is independent of speed.

Apparently, plausible estimates of this base speed range from one hundredth of a trillionth of human speed up to one millionth of human speed, with a middle estimate of one tenth of a billionth of human speed. This ratio apparently hasn’t changed much over four decades, giving reason to hope it can help us estimate the future base speed. I’ve separately estimated typical em speed to be one thousand times human speed, and the maximum speed where speed is still proportional to cost to be a million times human speed.

Thus the range of speeds over which em speeds are about proportional to cost is at least a factor of a trillion, and may be a billion trillion. Thus for typical speed ems the underworld abyss of slower ghostly speeds is very deep! If your career and investments go badly, and you are forced to cut back and slow down, there is a very long hill to slide down before you finally reach bottom, where the only lower place to go is to be erased. Em inequality in speeds is immense.

I just added this stuff about ghostly ems to my book The Age of Em: Work, Love and Life When Robots Rule The Earth. And since I’m to turn in the final draft by Saturday, this will be the last thing I add. Publication date still not set; I’ll tell you when I know.

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Em Redistribution

I’m in the last few weeks of finishing my book The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life When Robots Rule The Earth, about social outcomes in a world dominated by brain emulations. As a teaser, let me share some hopefully non-obvious results about redistribution in the em world.

There are many kinds of inequality. Inequality exists between different species, between generations born at different times, and between nations of the world at a time. Within a nation at a time, there is inequality both between families and within families. There is also inequality across the moments of the life of each person. In all of these cases, there is not only financial inequality, but also inequality in status, prestige, pleasure, lifespan, happiness, and more. There is also inequality between the size of families, firms, cities, or nations, even when individuals within those groupings are equal.

Today, we have relatively little intentional redistribution between generations or between nations. Redistribution within the moments of a person’s life happens, but that is mostly left to that person to choose and to fund. Similarly, redistribution between siblings is mostly achieved via differential treatment by parents. Instead, most concern today about inequality, and most debate about redistribution to address inequality, focuses on one very particular “standard” kind of inequality.

This standard inequality looks at differences in average individual financial incomes between the families of a nation, all at a given time. This type of inequality is actually one of the smallest. For example, in the U.S. today financial inequality between families is only one third the size of that inequality between siblings within families, and even that is much less than the inequality between individuals from different nations. We may focus our redistribution feelings on this standard inequality because it seems to us the most analogous to the inequality that forager sharing norms addressed. Alternatively, perhaps it is the most profitable type of redistribution for opportunistic rent-seekers.

This history suggests that the em world will have little redistribution between em generations or city states, and also that each clan is mostly in charge of deciding how to address inequality within that clan. After all, em clan members are more similar and closer to each other than are human siblings, even if they may sometimes be more distant from each other than are typical human life moments. Also, clan members have rather complex relations with each other, making it hard pick a natural sub-clan unit to be the standard basis for counting inequality. So that leaves ems with comparing inequality between clans.

A set of em clans can be unequal in two different ways. One way focuses on individual incomes, or perhaps individual happiness or respect, and says that a clan is better off if its individuals are on average better off. The other way focuses on the overall size and success of a clan. Here a clan is better off if it has more members, resources, or respect. Historically, most redistribution efforts have focused on average individual outcomes. For example, we have seen very little efforts to redistribute between human family clans based on family size. That is, we almost never take from families with many descendants in order to give to families that have few descendants. Nor do we take much from big nations, cities, or firms to give to smaller ones.

Because most em wages are near subsistence levels, unregulated wages have less inequality than do wages today. So em clans naturally have less inequality of the standard sort that is the focus of today’s redistribution. In contrast, em clans have enormous inequality in clan size, resources, and respect. However, history gives little reason to expect much redistribution to address this inequality. It is not very analogous to forager sharing, nor does it lend itself to profitable rent-seeking.

Thus the main kind of redistribution that we have reason to expect in the em era is between the clans of a city, based on differences of average within-clan individual income. But we expect less inequality of this sort in the em world, and so expect less redistribution on this basis.

Income taxes are today one of our main mechanisms for reducing the standard inequality that compares individual incomes between families within a nation. Over the last two centuries, big increases in the top marginal tax rates have mostly followed wars where over two percent of the population served in the military. For example, in the U.S. the top marginal tax rate jumped from 15% to 67% in 1917, during World War I. Controlling for this effect, top tax increases have not been correlated with wealth, democracy, or the political ideology of the party running the government. This weakly suggests that the local degree of individual income redistribution between the clans of an em city may depend on the local frequency of large expensive em wars.

If ordinary humans are included straightforwardly in the redistribution systems of the em world, then the simple result to expect is transfers, not only away from richer humans, but also from humans to ems overall. After all, in purely financial terms typical ems are poorer than the poorest humans. Redistribution systems may perhaps correct for the fact that em subsistence levels are much lower than are human subsistence levels. But if so such systems may also encourage or even require recipients of aid to switch from being a human to being an em, in order to lower costs.

During the em era, humans typically have industrial era incomes, which are much higher than subsistence level incomes. While many and perhaps most humans may pay to create a few ems, they tend to endow them with much higher than subsistence incomes. In contrast, a small number of successful humans manage to give rise to large em clans, and within these clans most members have near subsistence incomes. Thus transfers based on individual income inequality take from the descendants of less successful humans and give to descendants of more successful humans.

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Em Scale Economies

Angle, a relaunched journal from Imperial College London, “focuses on the intersection of science, policy and politics in an evolving and complex world.” The current issue focuses on economies of scale, and includes a short paper of mine on ems:

I focus on two key results related to economies of scale. … First, an em economy grows faster that ours by avoiding the diminishing returns to capital that we suffer because we can’t grow labour fast enough. Second, an economy has larger cities because it avoids the commuting congestion costs that limit our city sizes. (more)

Of course an em economy has many other important scale economies; those where just the two I could explain in the two thousand words given me.

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My Two May Em Talks

You are invited to attend two unusual conferences where I’ll speak in May:

1. INSTED: Agitate! Los Angeles, May 2, 10am-10pm. $25 if you act fast. I talk at time TBD:

The Age Of Em: Envisioning Brain Emulation Societies

Tired of all the wining and boasting on the latest tech & politics trends? See it all shrink to insignificance as we contemplate the next revolution on the scale of the farming and industrial revolutions. The Age of Em will start sometime in the next century; in it, brain emulations could change almost everything. (video)

2. Building The New World Conference, May 28-31, Radford University in Virginia,  $375 for 4 days includes food & room. I talk at 3:30pm May 30 on:

When Men Become Machines: Meaning, Identity, and Ethics at the Advent of a Trans-Human Era and Emulation-Based Singularity.

The three most disruptive transitions in history were the introduction of humans, farming, and industry. Another transition lies ahead: Artificial Intelligence in the form of whole brain emulations – “ems” – sometime in the next century. We will explore the upcoming Trans-Human Era, which will include ems, using a broad synthesis of standard academic consensus, and we will outline a baseline scenario for this “Singularity.” Lastly, we will consider not only the economics of this new world, but also the meaning and identity that human residents will experience during this unprecedented shift. (video)

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Perfect Bits

Did you know that your phone, pad, and laptop are all “computers” wherein all relevant info is stored in “bits”? And did you further know that you can get tools to let you very easily change almost any of those bits? Since you can change most any bits in these devices, you need never tolerate any imperfections in anything that results from those bits. Thus you should never see any disagreeable screen or menu or feature or outcome in any app in any of those systems for more than a short moment. Same for books, music, and movies. After all, as soon as you notice any imperfection, why you’ll open your tool, change the bad bits, and abra cadabra, the system will be perfect again. Right?

In Mind Uploading Will Replace the Need for Religion, “Award-winning #1 Bestseller Philosophy & Sci-Fi Visionary” and Transhumanist Party presidential candidate Zoltan Istvan applies the same penetrating insight to future ems:

Being able to upload our entire minds into a computer is probably just 25-35 years off. … As people begin uploading themselves, they’ll also be hacking and writing improved code for their new digital selves. … This influx of better code will eliminate … stupidity and social evil. …

In the future, we may all have avatars—perfectly uploaded versions of ourselves … [who] will help guide us and not allow us to do dumb or terrible things. … Someone trustworthy will always be in our head, advising us of the best path to take. …

This is why the future will be far better than it is now. In the coming digital world, we may be perfect, or very close to it. Expect a much more utopian society for whatever social structures end up existing in virtual reality and cyberspace. But also expect the real world to radically improve. Expect the drug user to have their addictions corrected or overcome. Expect the domestic abuser to have their violence and drive for power diminished. Expect the mentally depressed to become happy. And finally, expect the need for religion to disappear as a real-life god—our near perfect moral selves—symbiotically commune with us. (more)

Well there’s a few complications. Humans don’t always take advice they are given. And since brains were designed by evolution, we expect their code to be harder to read and usefully change than the device app code written by humans. But surely those are only small bumps on our short 35 year road to utopia. Right?

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Oxford To Publish The Age Of Em

Eighteen months ago I asked here for readers to criticize my Em Econ book draft, then 62K words. (137 of you sent comments – thanks!) Today I announce that Oxford University Press will publish its descendant (now 212K words) in Spring 2016. Tentative title, summary, outline:

The Age Of Em: Work, Love and Life When Robots Rule The Earth

Author Robin Hanson takes an oft-mentioned disruptive future tech, brain emulations, and expertly analyzes its social consequences in unprecedented breadth and detail. His book is intended to prove: we can foresee our social future, not just by projecting trends, but also by analyzing the detailed social consequences of particular disruptive future technologies.

I. Basics
1. Start: Contents, Preface, Introduction, Summary
2. Modes: Precedents, Factors, Dreamtime, Limits
3. Mechanics: Emulations, Opacity, Hardware, Security
II. Physics
4. Scales: Time, Space, Reversing
5. Infrastructure: Climate, Cooling, Buildings
6. Existence: Virtuality, Views, Fakery, Copying, Darkness
7. Farewells: Fragility, Retirement, Death
III. Economics
8. Labor: Wages, Selection, Enough
9. Efficiency: Competition, Eliteness, Spurs, Power
10. Business: Institutions, Growth, Finance, Manufacturing
11. Lifecycle: Careers, Age, Preparation, Training
IV. Organization
12. Clumping: Cities, Speeds, Transport
13. Extremes: Software, Inequality, War
14. Groups: Clans, Nepotism, Firms, Teams
15. Conflict: Governance, Law, Innovation
V. Sociology
16. Connection: Mating, Signaling, Identity, Ritual
17. Collaboration: Conversation, Synchronization, Coalitions
18. Society: Profanity, Divisions, Culture, Stories
19. Minds: Humans, Unhumans, Intelligence, Psychology
VI. Implications
20. Variations: Trends, Alternatives, Transition, Aliens
21. Choices: Evaluation, Policy, Charity, Success
22. Finale: Critics, Conclusion, References, Thanks
23. Appendix: Motivation, Method, Biases

Added Sept2015: The book now has a website.

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Ian Morris on Foragers, Farmers, Industry, & Ems

The book Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels by Ian Morris will be published March 22. As I don’t see any other reviews on the web, it seems I get to be the first. This is from the publisher’s blurb:

Most people in the world today think democracy and gender equality are good, and that violence and wealth inequality are bad. But most people who lived during the 10,000 years before the nineteenth century thought just the opposite. … Fundamental long-term changes in values, Morris argues, are driven by the most basic force of all: energy. Humans have found three main ways to get the energy they need—from foraging, farming, and fossil fuels. Each energy source sets strict limits on what kinds of societies can succeed, and each kind of society rewards specific values. … The ongoing revolution in energy capture means that our most cherished values are very likely to turn out—at some point fairly soon—not to be useful any more.

I’m delighted that, like me, Morris divides human history into three great eras of foraging, farming, and industry. Furthermore, Morris suggests that a new era may start by 2082, perhaps based on brain emulations of the entire human population. He notes that these different past eras have been associated with dramatically different values, and suggests that the next era will also have very different values. So far remarkably similar to what I’ve been saying here for years!

Morris resists the idea that some eras have correct values while others have incorrect values. Instead he sees each era’s values as adapted to the environment of that era, i.e., to its technical methods of production and survival. Morris also sees the modes of energy production as central and even defining of those environments. Which is why he calls our industry era the “fossil fuel” era.

Morris does little to argue for the centrality of energy production tech in era environments. He doesn’t identify possible alternative centrality concepts with which to compare his view, nor does he offer evidence that might distinguish his energy-centrality from other views. Instead, Morris seems content to just assume energy centrality. While this stance didn’t at all persuade me of energy centrality, nothing anything else in his book seems to actually depend on this claim. So I’m happy to just set it aside, and focus on other issues.

Morris’s most interesting claim is that values during each era were adapted in great detail to the environments of those eras. And Morris fills up most of his book with details on both the environments and values of past eras. Enough details to make it clear that different eras did in fact have distinctively different environments and values. There are in fact typical forager environments, typical forager values, and so on for farming and industry. Yes there are exceptions, but that doesn’t invalidate the basic patterns.

However, Morris actually doesn’t try very hard to give specific explanations matching the specific features of each typical environment to specific features of each typical value set. It seems that his belief in strong adaptation of values to environments isn’t much based on such specific matches. Instead, Morris mainly just seems to be very impressed by how consistently different were the environments and values of each era. It is as if he reasons “why would all the farming values be like each other, and yet so different from foraging values, if not for being adaptations to the new distinct farming environment?”

Now I do pretty much accept this story regarding the foraging and farming eras. But this is because those eras lasted so very long, and we can see so much selection among units that could plausibly produce this adaptation. Foragers and farmers were both literally dirt poor, and so it didn’t take that much of a relative advantage to kill off one group and replace it with another. Foragers lasted for many thousands of generations, long enough to create enormous variance in the success of specific lineages and specific local cultures. And while the farming era lasted only a few hundred generations, we can see in history wave after wave after wave of cultures being displaced by other cultures, via war and famine and much else.

But while it is hard to deny great selection of cultures, including their values, during the foraging and farming eras, the case for selection seems to me to be far weaker for our industry era. Industry has seen less than a dozen generations of humans, and most of them are today rich enough to suffer little selection from insufficient material wealth. Yes, we have seen terrible wars, but they have been small and rare enough to impose only very mild selection pressures.

Now we do more plausibly see a lot of selection in industry era work and organization practices. Enough firms are born and die fast enough to accumulate a lot of selection pressure. In addition, to a modest degree firms can copy the practices at more successful firms, and so adapt without dying. And all this can plausibly explain a great many particular changes in the physical and social technologies used by such firms.

However, the “values” that Morris has in mind as being adapted to each era are grand things like favoring democracy, open markets, gender equality, and rule of law, and disfavoring violence, slavery, and wealth-inequality. The World Values Survey has tracked changes in such values and found that they are not much attributable to more successful nations displacing other nations, or even more successful people replacing others within a nation.

Instead the literature on cultural value change suggests that it is the same people who are changing their values over time, and that this change is caused to a substantial extent by increasing wealth. This does not look like selection at all, but looks instead like the revealing of a common internal conditionality in human values. Because our values are conditional on our wealth, they naturally move toward the industry-era value set as we get rich. My guess here is that we are reverting to forager era values, at least outside of work, as we less feel the strength of farmer-era pressures like fear, religion, and conformity.

In his book, Morris does mention that some people have challenged his claim that industry values are adapted by pointing to our low and falling industry era fertility rates, which seem very hard to understand as adaptive behavior. In response, Morris points out that we haven’t seen the long term effects of that low fertility yet, and notes that the low fertility rich might still win in the future by becoming highly copied brain emulations. But even if that ends up happening, it seems hard to see low industry fertility as an adaptation designed to produce that outcome.

But even if I disagree with Morris about the causes of industry era value changes, I can still agree that the values of the next era are likely to be quite different from industry era values, and that those values would be well adapted to that next era. While I’m not sure what reasons Morris would offer for that claim, my reasons are specific to my analysis of the details of a new era based on brain emulations.

In my analysis, wages fall to subsistence levels, margins of survival are slim, and competition is strong. That should plausibly reverse industry era changes due to increasing wealth per person, and create a lot of selection. In addition, greatly increased brain emulation speeds allow many generations of changes to happen in short clock times, allowing for more variation and selection of individuals and practices.

In sum, Morris gets an awful lot right about history, and about the future. I just wish he had attended a bit more to the details of how values get selected, and which values are in fact adaptive in which environments.

Added 9a: I gave no direct quotes because the book copy I have forbids that.

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Help Me Imagine 2

Back in April I asked readers to help me imagine:

[Your] community was … so successful … that one hundred exact copies of [it] were made then and spread around the world. They copied all the same people, work and play roles and relationships, even all the workspaces and homes. … Consider … your attitude toward the other copies of your group. On one hand, … you might want to have nothing to do with those other copies. … On the other hand, you might be eager to maximize your chances to share insights and learn from the other groups. (more)

Today let me ask for help imagining a different situation.

A copy of you was made when you were ten years old. That was a century ago. Since then many thousands of (exact) copies have been made from that one copy. Most of these copies have grown up to do one of the few jobs where there is a big demand for copies of you. (Copies of you have tried other jobs, but so far they’ve not been competitive.) Every year a few dozen more copies are made and trained for these same few careers, but using slightly newer methods, to adapt to changing customers, techs, etc. Older versions of you often help to train younger versions.

Now here are my key questions:

  1. As an older copy, how free would you feel to push advice on younger copies? You could advice them on work, friends, love, etc. When there were consequences for you, how strongly would you want to insist that they follow your advice?
  2. As a younger copy, how much would you trust the advice of older copies of yourself? How eager would you be to get and follow such advice, even when you didn’t understand it? How willing would you be to get into situations where you had to do what they told you?

Today as parents, teachers, mentors, etc. we often give advice to kids, students, and junior co-workers. But our eagerness to advise is tempered by knowing that they are often quite different from us, and in addition times can change, reducing the relevance of our earlier experience. Our eagerness to listen to such advice when young is also tempered by the same reasons. Even so, the two sides often find themselves in conflict, with older folks pushing more advice than the younger folks want to take.

When the advisor-advisee relation is between an older and younger copy of at the same person, instead of between two quite different people, is there more or less conflict in the relation? Is more or less advice given and taken to heart? Do people feel more or less free and autonomous?

Added 5p: Today if asked in the (far-view) abstract, people say they’d want to take advice from those more experienced than they. But they often feel different when they get a specific (near-view) piece of advice that they don’t want to follow, or when they feel a rivalry with the person giving the advice. Then people look for excuses not to follow the advice. I’d think the same processes would happen even with copies of yourself. So I ask you to imagine particular near-view situations, and not just to consider the question in far-view.

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“I Robot, You Unemployed”

Tomorrow (Wednesday) at 7pm EST I’ll do a Learn Liberty Live! web presentation on “I, Robot. You, Unemployed” here. After a short ten minute presentation, I’ll lead ninety minutes of discussion. I expect to focus on em econ.

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