Tag Archives: Disagreement

No Offense Offends

By Robin Hanson · March 2, 2010 10:00 am · Comments (23)

no offense – A phrase used to make insults seem socially acceptable.

On Facebook, Greg Benford said:

When I ignore requests for drinks, cupcakes, palm trees, etc. to take part Mafia Wars it’s not a statement about the folks who are enjoying such pursuits. If I accepted this invitation to play in a space fleet game (how cool is that?) I would never get anything done. It’s so easy to get distracted as a writer which is why I’m declining all these lovely invitations. Now back to work.

I responded:

You are making a good choice, but you can’t avoid the fact that your choice is also a statement about the choices that others make.

Greg often faces a choice between playing and getting work done, and he seems to usually respect more the choice to get work done.  When he sees other folks choose instead to play, surely he must infer a substantial chance that they faced a similar choice but made the choice he respects less.  Even if he doesn’t think this way, and even if he explicitly says this, the rest of us must assign a substantial chance that he does in fact think this way.  Yes we can’t be sure, but even so, on average disagreement is disrespect.

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Smart Beliefs

By Robin Hanson · February 26, 2010 8:00 am · Comments (72)

Adult intelligence predicts adult espousal of liberalism, atheism, and sexual exclusivity for men (but not for women), while intelligence is not associated with the adult espousal of evolutionarily familiar values on children, marriage, family, and friends. … Childhood intelligence at age 10 significantly increases the probability that individuals become vegetarian as adults.

More here.  The author interprets these findings:

More intelligent individuals should be better able to comprehend and deal with evolutionarily novel (but not evolutionarily familiar) entities and situations. …. There has been accumulating evidence for this. …

  1. Individuals’ tendency to respond to TV characters as if they were real friends … appears to be limited to those with below-median intelligence. …
  2. Net of age, race, sex, education, marital history, and religion, less intelligent individuals have more children than more intelligent individuals, even though they do not want to do so. …
  3. More intelligent individuals stay healthier and live longer … [but] general intelligence does not appear to affect health and longevity in sub-Saharan Africa, where many of the health threats and dangers are more evolutionarily familiar. …
  4. Criminals on average have lower intelligence than the general population … Much of what we call interpersonal crime today, such as murder, assault, robbery, and theft, were probably routine means of intrasexual male competition in the ancestral environment, … [and] the institutions that control, detect, and punish criminal behavior in society today—the police, the courts, and the prisons—are all evolutionarily novel. …

Liberalism … [is] the genuine concern for the welfare of genetically unrelated others and the willingness to contribute larger proportions of private resources for the welfare of such others.  Defined as such, liberalism is evolutionarily novel. Humans … are not designed to be altruistic toward an indefinite number of complete strangers whom they are not likely ever to meet or exchange with. … There is no evidence that people in contemporary hunter-gatherer bands freely share resources with members of other tribes. …

Our ancestors … could have attributed [an ambiguous situation] to intentional forces when they are in fact caused by unintentional forces … or they could have attributed them to unintentional forces when they were in fact caused by intentional forces. … [The] evolutionary origin of religious beliefs in supernatural forces may stem from such an innate bias to commit Type I errors rather than Type II errors. … Out of more than 1,500 distinct cultures … only 19 contain any references to atheism. …

A species-typical degree of polygyny correlates with the extent of sexual dimorphism in size. … On this scale, humans are mildly polygynous, not as polygynous as gorillas, but not strictly monogamous like gibbons. Consistent with this comparative evidence, … an overwhelming majority of traditional cultures in the world (83.39 percent) practice polygyny with only 16.14 percent practicing monogamy and 0.47 percent practicing polyandry.

The results are interesting and worth pondering, but it is still far from clear to me why the modern world should push smart folks in these directions.  Is it that smart folks are more open minded and willing to adopt new beliefs?  If so, why do they differ only on some topics but not on others?  Is it that some beliefs are newly rewarded in the modern world, and smart folks are faster on the uptake?  This makes some sense of monogamy values, since the farming revolution has preferred that institution (longer term investments, easier to hold women).  But how does this story make sense of smart folks being more liberal, atheist, or vegetarian?

HT Ajay Menon

Added 11a: Folks, these beliefs cannot credibly signal smarts if dumb folks can hold them as easily.  Perhaps dumb folks cannot defend these beliefs as ably, but dumb folks cannot defend any belief as ably.  So credibly signal smarts via defending such beliefs, it would have to be that one’s smarts shone more clearly when defending these beliefs, vs. when defending other beliefs on the same topic.

Could these be more far-mode beliefs, and smarties tend to think more far?

Added 28Feb: Apparently this source has questionable reliability.  So I won’t try so hard to explain his odd results.

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Praise Polymaths

By Robin Hanson · February 12, 2010 9:15 am · Comments (34)

Once upon a time folks who traveled far were treated with suspicion.  Sure if you were rich and traveled like the rich you weren’t more suspicious than other rich.  But those who traveled more than their class were suspected, correctly on average, of being less loyal to their neighbors.

Today travel is mostly celebrated; people love to talk about their trips and admire the well-traveled, even beyond the wealth it signals.  But travel today doesn’t much threaten loyalty – intellectual contact with locals is limited, and usually selected to be like-minded.  Ooh look, another pretty building.  True intellectual travel, where you actually take the time to see things from different perspectives, is rare, more valuable, and yet elicits more suspicion than admiration.

You see, our beliefs are severely distorted by our culture and training, and intellectual travel remains our only remotely reliable remedy.  We all know that we would have been inclined toward different beliefs had we been raised in different cultures or disciplines.  We see consistent differences between folks trained in West vs. East, science vs. humanities, economics vs. sociology, and in different schools of thought of most any discipline.  We like to think that we correct for this, but when we realize how hard that is, we throw up our hands saying “what ya gonna do?” Continue Reading "Praise Polymaths" »

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Weighing Scientists

By Robin Hanson · January 25, 2010 10:30 pm · Comments (20)

The latest (top science journal) Nature has an editorial on the need for better ways to communicate expert uncertainty on key topics like climate change, and a two-pager by Willy Aspinall on “More tractable expert advice“:

Of the many ways of gathering advice from experts, the Cooke method is, in my view, the most effective when data are sparse, unreliable or unobtainable. … Take as an example an elicitation I conducted in 2003, to estimate the strength of the thousands of small, old earth dams in the United Kingdom. Acting as facilitator, I first organized a discussion between a group of selected experts. … The experts were then asked individually to give their own opinion of the time-to-failure in a specific type of dam, once such leakage starts. They answered with both a best estimate and a ‘credible interval’, for which they thought there was only a 10% chance that the true answer was higher or lower. Continue Reading "Weighing Scientists" »

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Dissing Citizens

By Robin Hanson · January 24, 2010 10:00 am · Comments (36)

Imagine a “democracy” where citizens could technically vote for anyone, but where authorities strongly recommended particular candidates for each office, and those who voted for others were given extensive psychiatric treatment, out of concern for their welfare, and taken away from their jobs and families, out of concern for the welfare of others.  Technically, this could make sense — maybe there really is always a clear best candidate, and only crazy folks would think otherwise.

But this situation could also easily describe strong repression, and it seems to dis voters by restricting their control.  People like democracy in part because it raises their status, by making them seem in control.  But if so, voter status must fall as that appearance of control is restricted by law — there is an essential tension between democracy and regulation that overrules voter beliefs.

While we have many kinds of regulations supported by many kinds of rationales, one very common rationale is bias, that people make bad choices, bad not just for society as a whole, but bad for each particular choosing person according to their own preferences, holding constant all other decisions.  Such rationales are commonly offered regarding product safety, professional licensing, and financial regulations, and in legal and election procedures.

It may well be that many people do often make such mistakes, and that they are furthermore stubborn enough not to listen to advice telling them about their mistakes.  So it might well require government force to keep folks from hurting themselves via unwise choices.  But there is a real conflict between telling voters they are wise enough to run the government, and using force to keep them from acting on many of their beliefs.

Consider: which voters are in charge of the policies that keep voters from acting on their beliefs – can these two groups of voters really be the same?  Yes, citizens may realize they are error-prone and intend to use government to keep them from making mistakes.  But then voters would only need to be advised by the government of their mistakes, not forced to follow government advice.  And voluntary deals with private orgs could achieve the same outcome.  Yes perhaps a majority of voters tries to keep a minority of voters from their mistakes, but if so why is such force applied to all voters?

This tension becomes especially strong when voters are prevented by force from acting on their political beliefs.  Consider legal limits on which candidates voters may elect to public office, limits on policies candidates may advocate, or limits on advisors voters may hear on candidates and policies.  Such limits should detract from the status of being a voter in control of government – these limits seem to publicly declare that voters cannot be trusted on certain of their beliefs, and that the elites who set and maintain such limits (e.g., court judges) are the rightful higher-status rulers over such foolish lower-status voting rabble.

But what is clear to me may well not be clear to most voters.  Voting is done in an especially thoughtless sort of far mode, where a great many contradictions remain unnoticed.  But with time, this conflict may become more obvious – how then will voters resolve it, by demanding fewer limits on their actions, or by limiting the vote to a smaller subset of less obviously foolish citizens?

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Free Hearing, Not Speech

By Robin Hanson · January 23, 2010 12:25 am · Comments (77)

Control is a key status marker; all else equal those who give orders are above those who take orders.  This seems to be the main reason for democracy’s popularity, not that it makes better decisions but that it raises citizen status, by appearing to put citizens in control.

Consider also that we call it “free speech,” not “free hearing.”  The usual rationale for “free speech,” which seems persuasive, is that in the long run we as a society learn more via an open competition for the best ideas, where anyone can try to persuade us as best they can, and listeners are free to choose what to hear.  Yet that concept would best be called “free hearing” – a freedom to hear and evaluate any case presented, based on any criteria you like (including cost).  It is not a right to make others listen to you.

“Free hearing” would apply not just to hearing from adult citizens in good standing, but also to hearing from children, convicts, corporations, robots, foreigners, or demons.  We wouldn’t argue if corporations have a right to speak, but rather if we have a right to hear what corporations have to say.

But in fact we have “free speech,” a right only enjoyed by adult citizens in good standing, a right we jealously guard, wondering if corporations etc. “deserve” it.  This right seems more a status marker, like the right to vote, than a way to promote idea competition — that whole competition story seems more an ex post rationalization than the real cause for our concern.  Which is why support for “free speech” is often paper thin, fluctuating with the status of proposed speakers.

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Why Anti-Elite Era?

By Robin Hanson · January 11, 2010 11:00 am · Comments (65)

This is fascinating:

During the great moments of social reform, at least 60 percent of Americans trusted government to do the right thing most of the time. Now, only a quarter have that kind of trust. The country is evenly divided about President Obama, but state governments are in disrepute and confidence in Congress is at withering lows. …

Every single idea associated with the educated class has grown more unpopular over the past year.  The educated class believes in global warming, so public skepticism about global warming is on the rise. The educated class supports abortion rights, so public opinion is shifting against them. The educated class supports gun control, so opposition to gun control is mounting. … The educated class believes in multilateral action, so the number of Americans who believe we should “go our own way” has risen sharply.

More here.   Possible explanations:

  1. Folks trust authorities less in times of economic decline.
  2. US elites have over-played their hand, asking too much.
  3. US folks are morally balancing for electing a black president.

More theories?  Ideas for how to distinguish theories?

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Disagreer’s Dilemna

By Robin Hanson · January 5, 2010 11:30 am · Comments (3)

There’s a tension between (a) wanting to believe that people who disagree with us aren’t so smart or successful and (b) wanting to believe that our opponents are successful because of external factors such as wealth, social status, and rhetorical ability. Liberals as well as conservatives can be torn, I think, between (a) thinking of their political opponents as pitiful losers, and (b) resenting the other side for having all sorts of unearned advantages.

That is Andrew Gelman, recommended by TGGP.  Naturally die-hard disagreers presume their opponents are both stupid and witty/well-connected.

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Why Comments Snark

By Robin Hanson · January 4, 2010 5:00 pm · Comments (58)

Katja Grace asks:

Commentary on blogs usually comes in two forms: comments there and posts on other blogs. In my experience, comments tend to disagree and to be negative or insulting much more than links from other blogs are. In a rough count of comments and posts taking a definite position on this blog, 25 of 35 comments disagreed, while 1 of 12 posts did, even if you don’t count another 11 posts which link without comment, a seemingly approving act. Why is this?

She suggests:

Commenters are visible only to others in that particular comments section. Nobody else there will be impressed or interested to observe that you read this blogger or story, as they all [do]. So the choice of whether to affiliate doesn’t matter, and all the fun is in showing superiority within that realm. Pointing out that the blogger is wrong shows you are smarter than they.

I don’t see why comments can’t affiliate as easily as posts, but I agree comments often disagree to gain status at the expense of post authors. Constant comments:

One’s correction of error tends typically to be much more throw-away than one’s original thoughts. If you want to correct an error, and if you do not think the correction particularly interesting, you might choose to do it in the comments of the blog that committed the error.

My explanation is related, but darker: Comments disagree more than responding posts because post, but not comment, authors must attract readers.  Post authors expect that reader experiences of a post will influence whether those readers come back for future posts.  In contrast, comment authors less expect reader experience to influence future comment readership; folks read blog posts more because of the post author than who they expect to author comments there.

This induces snarkier comments for two reasons:

  1. Intelligent post authors can usually anticipate the main post “corrections.”  Posts written for readability simply cannot mention every related disclaimer, caveat, alternate interpretation, or follow-on question.  This leaves a huge opening for comments to seem smart by pointing out such things, even when they are boring.
  2. When you post a friendly response to someone else’s post, you can hope for reciprocal posts later, where they respond to one of your posts.  This is less likely when your post is critical, or if you just comment on their post; they may not even know you have a blog.

A similar theory explains why large email lists and usenet groups were often so harsh; each contributor had relatively little influence over the subscriber experience.  This theory also suggests a fix: let blog readers mark comment authors they like, and read all blog post comments via an interface that emphasizes authors they personally like.  Comment authors would then face incentives similar to post authors to please readers.

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Balance Blocks News Info

By Robin Hanson · December 17, 2009 8:00 am · Comments (23)

When reporters are assigned to write articles on controversial topics, how much readers can learn from their articles depends on how much those reporter learn when investigating their topics.

Now on most controversies readers expect to see two main sides, each easily predicted from standard social divisions like left vs. right, male vs. female, etc.  So if a reporter interviews a random set of smart folks knowledgeable on a topic, they are likely to hear a wide range of complex opinions and arguments, and so they risk appearing confusing and unbalanced by giving too little coverage to one of the two main sides.

So busy reporters take an easier approach: they keep a stable of standard sources who are clearly identified with some side of a standard division, e.g., left or right, and can be relied on to take predictable positions associated with that side.  That is, they interview ideologues.

Ideologues allow reporters to quickly collect quotes to fill out a standard story format, listing some arguments from each of the two expected sides.  If reporters instead interviewed generally smart thoughtful people, they’d get more and more complex positions.  These would be harder to explain, and risk the article seeming unfairly balanced.

There are three kinds of info one might learn about any controversy:

  1. What are the various positions taken
  2. Which folks take what positions
  3. What arguments are offered for and against each position

What we learn from the usual reporter process is mainly the arguments offered by ideologues trying to support the expected two sides.  We don’t learn about arguments that don’t clearly support an expected side, nor about the wider space of positions taken, nor about the distribution of opinions on the topic.

From Alex Tabarrok explaining why he gets interviewed more often than Nobel prize winners.

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