Author Archives: Carl Shulman

“Evicting” brain emulations

Follow up to: Brain Emulation and Hard Takeoff

Suppose that Robin’s Crack of a Future Dawn scenario occurs: whole brain emulations (‘ems’) are developed, diverse producers create ems of many different human brains, which are reproduced extensively until the marginal productivity of em labor approaches marginal cost, i.e. Malthusian near-subsistence wages. Ems that hold capital could use it to increase their wealth by investing, e.g. by creating improved ems and collecting the fruits of their increased productivity, by investing in hardware to rent to ems, or otherwise. However, an em would not be able to earn higher returns on its capital than any other investor, and ems with no capital would not be able to earn more than subsistence (including rental or licensing payments). In Robin’s preferred scenario, free ems would borrow or rent bodies, devoting their wages to rental costs, and would be subject to "eviction" or "repossession" for nonpayment.

In this intensely competitive environment, even small differences in productivity between em templates will result in great differences in market share, as an em template with higher productivity can outbid less productive templates for scarce hardware resources in the rental market, resulting in their "eviction" until the new template fully supplants them in the labor market. Initially, the flow of more productive templates and competitive niche exclusion might be driven by the scanning of additional brains with varying skills, abilities, temperament, and values, but later on em education and changes in productive skill profiles would matter more.

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Brain Emulation and Hard Takeoff

The construction of a working brain emulation would require, aside from brain scanning equipment and computer hardware to test and run emulations on, highly intelligent and skilled scientists and engineers to develop and improve the emulation software. How many such researchers? A billion dollar project might employ thousands, of widely varying quality and expertise, who would acquire additional expertise over the course of a successful project that results in a working prototype. Now, as Robin says:

They would try multitudes of ways to cut corners on the emulation implementation, checking to see that their bot stayed sane.  I expect several orders of magnitude of efficiency gains to be found easily at first, but that such gains would quickly get hard to find.  While a few key insights would allow large gains, most gains would come from many small improvements.   

Some project would start selling bots when their bot cost fell substantially below the (speedup-adjusted) wages of a profession with humans available to scan.  Even if this risked more leaks, the vast revenue would likely be irresistible.   

To make further improvements they would need skilled workers up-to-speed on relevant fields and the specific workings of the project’s design. But the project above can now run an emulation at a cost substantially less than the wages it can bring in. In other words, it is now cheaper for the project to run an instance of one of its brain emulation engineers than it is to hire outside staff or collaborate with competitors. This is especially so because an emulation can be run at high speeds to catch up on areas it does not know well, faster than humans could be hired and brought up to speed, and then duplicated many times. The limiting resource for further advances is no longer the supply of expert humans, but simply computing hardware on which to run emulations.

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Sick of Textbook Errors

One of the most well-worn examples in introductions to Bayesian reasoning is testing for rare diseases: if the prior probability that a patient has a disease is sufficiently low, the probability that the patient has the disease conditional on a positive diagnostic test result may also be low, even for very accurate tests. One might hope that every epidemiologist would be familiar with this textbook problem, but this New York Times story suggests otherwise:

For months, nearly everyone involved thought the medical center had had a huge whooping cough outbreak, with extensive ramifications. [...]

Then, about eight months later, health care workers were dumbfounded to receive an e-mail message from the hospital administration informing them that the whole thing was a false alarm.

Now, as they look back on the episode, epidemiologists and infectious disease specialists say the problem was that they placed too much faith in a quick and highly sensitive molecular test that led them astray.

While medical professionals can modestly improve their performance on inventories of cognitive bias when coached, we should not overestimate the extent to which formal instruction such as statistics or epidemiology classes will improve actual behavior in the field.

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Should we Defer to Secret Evidence?

At the Volokh Conspiracy,  Stuart Benjamin raises an important question, asking:

whether we can articulate any useful metrics for when we should defer to self-serving statements by those with access to more information, and when we should not. In the two instances above, the doubters were vindicated. There are other examples in this vein. LBJ had access to greater information about the Gulf of Tonkin incident than did the doubters, but the latter were right, as the Pentagon and LBJ misrepresented what happened…

But there are counter-examples. Many people believed that Julius Rosenberg was innocent, but it is now clear the government really did have the goods on him, and that he was guilty. Same for Alger Hiss. Indeed, the airstrikes that President Clinton ordered at the height of the Lewinsky imbroglio – which were widely criticized as trumped up attempts at diverting attention, with little deference to the information asymmetry favoring the President – look quite different after September 11, 2001.

Two strategies for dealing with such asymmetries come to mind. One is an ex ante strategy, working to place unusually trustworthy individuals and groups in such positions (life-tenured judges, bipartisan committees, etc) or in positions where they can provide credible signals about justification (as Auditor-General, for instance). The other relies on the shadow of ex post punishment, which could be increased in inverse proportion to the probability of eventual detection.

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A Christmas Gift for Rationalists

Charitable donations are ripe with what seem to be irrationalities: door-to-door charitable contributions can be doubled when the donations are solicited by women 1 SD above the norm in attractiveness, we divide our contributions among multiple targets rather than putting 100% in the area with the highest marginal impact, and do very little to investigate charitable efficiency in the first place. At the same time, Christmas gifts are subject to staggering deadweight losses. In both cases, the failure to efficiently realize the supposed objective of benefitting the recipient can be explained by attributing the decision to a ‘purchase of identity,’ or signalling function. Someone who will tithe 10% of her income to Habitat for Humanity to build house for plump, but relatively poor, Westerners demonstrates her generosity just as well as someone who saves dozens of children from death by malaria by purchasing nets and DDT for an African village, even though the latter does more good.

My three-for-one proposal: rationalist types should ask for charitable gift certificates (the charity signs up as a project, and then recipients can allocate the value of their gift cards at will) this Christmas, and then donate the proceeds to some  high-impact but unconventional charity. (What’s the third bias addressed, you ask? The self-serving bias that keeps our charitable contributions so low!)

Some questions:
1. Will this bring in a smaller total in gift expenditures? Do weddings that request donations to a named charity take in less than those that use a gift registry?
2. Would an exchange of two $100 charitable gift certificates between friends really feel less silly than the exchange of two $100 bills because of the public commitment function?
3. Would this work for weddings or bar mitzvahs?

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Meme Lineages and Expert Consensus

Caesarean section rates differ dramatically in different regions of the United States, apparently a result of medical students and new doctors learning by imitation and adopting the customary practices of their workplaces. Given information about a doctor’s medical school and residency locations, one can predict her views on appropriate circumstances for C-sections, i.e. her actual opinion is less relevant in Bayesian calculations, since it reflects a known ‘meme lineage.’

Attempting to aggregate expert opinion by polling and weighting each expert’s contributions equally in the presence of such belief inheritance would be less informative than comparing the meme lineages holding particular views, and their respective defection rates. If scientific evidence more strongly supports one position, members of other lineages should be disproportionately likely to switch to it, and new entrants exposed to both ideas should disproportionately select it. In general, we should increase the weight we place on the flow (and its rate of change) in expert opinion, rather than the stock.

A study might compare the beliefs of PhD applicants, admitted students, and graduates on controversial topics in their fields relative to national peer groups in those fields. If the average beliefs of faculty at a school, or of students’ dissertation advisors, can predict changes in relative beliefs (e.g. moving students with scores on a belief-index that put them in the 80th percentile, relative to their same-year peers, to the 90th percentile over the course of a degree) then we will need to adjust our analysis of ‘academic consensus’ accordingly.

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