Monthly Archives: August 2011

Leading Isn’t About Info

The study recruited 150 participants and divided them into groups of three. One person was randomly assigned to be the group’s leader; all were told they could contribute advice, but that the leader was responsible for making the decision. Then they undertook a group task: choosing a job candidate. Of 45 items of information about the candidate, some were given to all three, and some to only one of the participants. … Group members rated the most narcissistic leaders as most effective. But … the groups led by the greatest egotists chose the worse candidate for the job. … “The narcissistic leaders … inhibited the communication because of self-centeredness and authoritarianism.” … Good leaders facilitate communication by asking questions and summarizing the conversation—something narcissists are too self-involved to do. (more; HT Karl Mattingly)

I predict that as the above result becomes more widely known, we will not much change our tendency to choose egotists as leaders. Yes the ability to get subordinates to reveal unusual info is valuable to the organization as a whole, but today this ranks pretty low among the many competing considerations in choosing a leader, and that probably won’t change much in the foreseeable future.

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Blackmail Enforces Law

A year ago, I pushed private bounty-based law enforcement:

For each type of crime, we’d set a bounty amount to be paid to anyone who successfully convinced a court that a particular in-custody person had committed that sort of crime. We’d have to decide what investigative powers to grant bounty hunters, what regulations to impose on them, and what plea-bargains to allow. We’d also have to set rules on when to detain suspects, and how to prevent double jeopardy. (Options below.) We might want especially solid anti-trust regulations.

Since I’ve talked about blackmail lately, I should mention that legalizing blackmail would create an especially cheap and flexible system of private law enforcement. If an associate of a criminal discovered evidence of their crime, this associate could via blackmail extract close to the cash equivalent of the punishment to the criminal. While this might modestly lower the level of punishment of a caught criminal, it should greatly increase the probability of punishment, leading to more expected punishment of crime. And relative to public police, blackmailers should have much lower costs to investigate crime and implement punishment.

The main academic complaints (e.g., here, here) against blackmail as private enforcement of law are complaints against the very idea of private enforcement of law. It would be just terrible, they say, if criminals got punished without everyone being officially informed. Law enforcers in general face temptations to obtain evidence illegally, and to treat the rich and poor differently, and they face possible violent retaliation from criminals – and we all just know, they say, that public police better deal with these problems. Some also fear that adding private enforcement onto an optimal public enforcement would create too much deterrence, not realizing that one could compensate by reducing public penalties and enforcement.

One unmentioned possible cost of blackmail is a weakening of the bonds that tie people together. You’ll be less open to people who could blackmail you. This is a cost of all law enforcement – you will, for example, be less open with someone who could testify against you in court. For this reason (supposedly), the law today privileges certain relationships, such as spouses, doctors, clergy, reporters, and researchers, against having to testify in court. Reasoning similarly, one could prohibit blackmail within specific relationships.

But as such privileges make it harder to protect the rest of us from their law breaking, it seems to me that they should have to pay us to gain this privilege, unless it is clear that their relation produces more than enough compensating benefits to us. One way to pay would be by sharing some responsibility for their crimes.

The distortion that I’d worry about most is that blackmail as private law enforcement creates an added incentive to associate with potential criminals and ne’er-do-wells, in order to later blackmail them. The cost of this distortion probably doesn’t outweigh the benefits of much cheaper enforcement, however.

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The Beauty Bias

As I write these words I’m riding a late night train, listening to some beautiful music and noticing a beautiful woman in the aisle opposite. And I can feel with unusual vividness my complete vulnerability to a beauty bias. The careful analytical thoughts I had hours before now seem, no matter what their care or basis, trivial and small by comparison.

If words and coherent thoughts came through this beauty channel, they would feel so much more compelling. If I had to choose between beauty and something plain or ugly, I would be so so eager to find excuses to choose beauty. If I needed to believe beauty was stronger or more moral or better for the world, reasons would be found, and it would feel easy to accept them.

This all horrifies the part of me that wants to believe what is true, based on some coherent and fair use of reasons and analysis. But I can see how very inadequate I am to resist it. The best I can do, it seems, is to not form beliefs or opinions while attending to beauty. Such as by avoiding music with non-trivial lyrics. And by wariness of opinions regarding a divide where one side is more beautiful. (Yes Tyler, this does question my taste for elegant theoretical simplicity.)

I have little useful advice here, alas, other than: know your limits. If you cannot help but to fall into a ditch if you walk nearby, then keep away, or accept that you’ll fall in.

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Our Gossip Muddle

Julia Galef wonders if it is ethical to view a leaked sex tape:

A celebrity sex tape … was stolen (or hacked, I’m not sure) and leaked to the public. … I asked my friend if he feels any guilt about watching this tape, knowing that the woman didn’t want other people to see it. … My friend and I are both utilitarians. … We were concerned … with … does watching the tape harm the woman? As my friend emphasized, she’ll never know that he watched it. … Maybe it makes more sense to define “harming someone” to mean, “helping create a world which that person would not want to exist, given the option.” … My friend [said]: “The ‘harm’ is not in people watching the tape but in them thinking worse of her. Which I didn’t, so — no harm done.”… [But] maybe the woman would’ve been embarrassed even if she knew people weren’t judging her poorly for the tape. After all, a lot of people don’t like the idea of someone accidentally seeing them naked.

This is a great example of the modern world’s confused attitude toward gossip and information property. In ancient Rome, and medieval Europe, you could be sued just for saying something bad about someone, even if true. After all, such words hurt, and the law discourages hurt. Today we hold gossip in higher regard, and so often think it both legal and moral to say embarassing things about people.

Yet we call some truths “private,” so that it is illegal or immoral to discover them via certain means (such as hidden cameras). But many see little wrong in passing such private info along to others, as long as they were not the one who did the initial illicit discovery. However, if it is good that others learn of some info, why is it bad for someone to initially discover and spread it? And if it is bad to have people learn of some info, why not ban people from sharing it?

We moderns are stuck with quite conflicting ideals: in general creating and sharing information is a good thing, except not about certain “private” topics. Yet we have only the vaguest notions of how to characterize such best-kept-private info. We could very much use a sharper analysis of what info it is bad for folks to know.

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Defenses of Hypocrisy

Excerpt from Guarding Life’s Dark Secrets:

I describe, chiefly for the nineteenth century, a complicated network of doctrines that seemed to be designed to protect reputation and that operated chiefly for the benefit of respectable men and women. … I call this network of doctrines the Victorian compromise. … Some … legal institutions … act to protect the reputation of people who are not innocent —people who are the victims, not of lies, but of the bitter truth. …

Take, for example, the crime of blackmail. … Who is the victim here? It is a man who has committed a crime or who has done some scandalous or awful act, one that would blacken his reputation if the news got out. Yet the law defines him as a victim. …

Take the old law about breach of promise. If a man promises to marry a woman and then backs out, she can sue him for damages. In many cases her real complaint is that she had sexual intercourse on the strength of his promise. … Here too the woman, like the blackmail “victim,” is hardly innocent. She violated nineteenth-century norms. She was guilty of fornication, which in many states was actually a crime. But despite her sins and transgressions, the law gave her this remedy. …

The living law of prostitution is yet another example … Prostitutes themselves were mostly social pariahs. … Yet, curiously enough, prostitution itself for much of our history was not actually illegal. Prostitutes were jailed as vagrants, and brothel keepers could be prosecuted, but buying and selling sex itself was not clearly labeled a crime. What this meant is that customers of prostitutes were immune from prosecution. … A screen of silence, and even some aspects of the formal law, shielded the men and protected their privacy and their reputations. …

The Victorian compromise … put enormous emphasis on surface behavior. The official rules remained in place, sometimes expressed in quite general or absolute terms; meanwhile, the law in action was quite different. There is a kind of double standard. No real attempt is made to enforce the official rules with vigor. They remain slogans or a kind of facade; or they are enforced selectively, according to norms and rules that are never made explicit. …

The Victorian compromise should not be dismissed as mere hypocrisy. The living law had a curious double standard, but this had a purpose, at least implicitly. … The laws relating to prostitution were like laws against speeding today. Nobody really thinks speed limits are totally effective. Everybody violates them from time to time. Enforcement is a sometime thing. But the laws, at existing levels of enforcement, are not useless or hypocritical. Arguably, they keep the amount of speeding under control. If you took off the lid entirely, who knows how fast and how recklessly some drivers might drive on the roads. (more; HT Peter Twieg)

Hypocrisy is rarely “mere.” Yes hypocritical acts are usually integrated into a complex equilibrium of mutually adapted behaviors, so that changing any one act alone tends to make things worse. But that hardly justifies hypocrisy – other matching changes are usually possible. For example, I’m told that in Australia they enforce speed limit laws pretty strictly. Speed limits are higher, and it all works out. By comparison, hypocritical speed limits in the U.S. mainly give police more discretion in whom to harass. This might be on net a good thing, but that sure isn’t obvious.

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The Future Is Further

More data supporting the idea that we treat the future as more far than the past:

In three studies, we demonstrate that people judge the same behavior as more intentional when it will be performed in the future than when it has been performed in the past. We found this temporal asymmetry in perceptions of both the strength of an individual‟s intention and the overall prevalence of intentional behavior in a population. Because of its heightened intentionality, people thought the same transgression deserved more severe punishment when it would occur in the future than when it did occur in the past. …

People are more likely to make spontaneous reference to intentions when talking about their future prospects than their past experiences. … Affect alone was not sufficient to explain why future transgressions warranted harsher punishment than past transgressions. … Eeven mundane behaviors (e.g., watering plants) are rated as more intentional in the future than the past, and that the temporal asymmetry is larger for relatively more intentional actions than relatively less intentional ones. (more; HT Tyler)

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Why I’m Not Libertarian

Over lunch yesterday, Bryan Caplan explained to me some finer points of standard libertarian legal philosophy. Here is my current understanding (errors mine of course):

Libertarians believe: Each human is endowed with property in his or her own body, and can obtain property in other physical objects, including land, via certain “making” processes. People can trade such property rights via explicit contracts. It is not morally permitted to violate property rights as determined by current contracts, except to defend or retaliate against other violations. Contract violations can happen via “fraud” (= lies) that create deviations between a contract’s words and deeds. (If a contract specifies damages for breach, it is not immoral to breach if you pay the specified damages.) There is more to morality, and within these constraints people should use their property to achieve such other morality.

I’m an economist who appreciates the economic analysis of law. I know how very useful property and contract can be in achieving economic efficiency. But the most efficient forms of property and contract are not obviously only these libertarian ones. For example, many sorts of non-physical property are probably efficient, beyond those that can easily be created via local contracts. It is probably sometimes efficient to initially allocate property in other ways than via the usual “making.” It is probably efficient to endow parents with partial ownership of their children. And it is probably efficient to enforce non-explicit contracts, such as among very large groups.

Yes most libertarians bite these bullets and say the libertarian choices are the moral ones, even if inefficient. But I just don’t find very compelling the morality of this urge to make most everyone worse off on average in order to follow certain traditional rules.

I especially get stuck on the claim that law should limit its attention to “physical,” not info, property and harms. (That’s in quotes because info is completely physical; in fact, there may be nothing physical that isn’t info.)  That is, physical rights are said to be pre-existing, but any info rights must be explicitly constructed by contract. Yet people can hurt each other “non-physically” via info in so many ways.

Many libertarians seem to feel they have discharged most of their info moral obligations if there is a reasonable interpretation of their words which has them telling no clear lies. As someone who spend most of my early economist years specializing in the economics of info, this seems spectacularly inadequate. I wonder if, as kids, libertarians tended to be witty weaklings – losing most fair physical fights, but winning most fair verbal sparring. Perhaps such kids prefer everyone to embrace the slogan “Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me,” because then the people they hurt via words can’t complain, because they can’t even admit they were hurt.

Now as a matter of practice, libertarians and I tend to agree in many policy disputes. Their support of property and contract often promotes economically efficient outcomes. And for that, I salute them. I even say sometimes that I “lean libertarian.” But I cannot embrace the above strict concept of libertarian morality.

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Real Policing

A columnist wary of police discretion in enforcing a teen curfew:

The County Council is considering an ill-conceived curfew for kids under 18 after a flash-mob gang fight … At the jam-packed hearing, Montgomery officers assured curfew skeptics and opponents that they weren’t out to lock up the kids coming home late from jobs or Harry Potter premieres. … So, how exactly do they plan on telling the good kids from the bad ones? I’m pretty sure most kids will forget their government-issued, GOOD KID ID badge every time they go out. A government-imposed curfew opens the door to harassment and profiling when what we need is policing of criminals and parenting of kids. (more)

A police officer responds:

Today’s Montgomery County police are part of one of the first generations of Americans to have grown up “color blind,” or for that matter, blind to all bias. ….

We are able to tell the bad kids based on their behavior. It’s the kids who come to hang out but never spend a dime at area businesses. The ones dropping the “F-bomb” so loud that you cringe when you’re walking by with your family. The ones who comment on the appearance of your daughters, walking behind them and taunting with comments so crude it would make a sailor blush. The ones who end up staying late, wanting to fistfight kids from other neighborhoods because of some street name or boundary line that is important only in their minds. The ones who follow you as you walk out of Silver Spring into the adjoining neighborhoods, snatching your iPhone and running to the Metro to get home. (more)

This exchange nicely illustrates the conflict between the ideals we want law to embody, of police just enforcing a clearly specified “law,” and the real messy peace-keeping tasks police actually perform. This police officer clearly expects to use lots of discretion in deciding who to harass. While it is not officially illegal to shop without buying, or to use swear words, or to care about neighborhood lines, he’d use those as indicators about whom to harass. He’d probably on average mostly harass kids that locals dislike, though he’d also probably act on personal biases and preferences. And I’ll bet that among police, the only unusual thing about his attitude is that he published it. Police must give lip-service to being “unbiased,” and local citizens will pretend along with them, if that’s what it takes to keep the peace.

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Blackmail Is Gossip+

Sticks and stones may my bones, but words will never hurt me. Old saying, that few believe.

A perverse man stirs up dissension, and a gossip separates close friends. (Proverbs 16:28)

They were filled with all manner of unrighteousness, evil, covetousness, malice. They are full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, maliciousness. They are gossips, slanderers, haters of God, insolent, haughty, boastful, … (Romans 1:29,30)

Law, first and foremost, keeps the peace. Sometimes people have big complaints about others, complaints so big that they are tempted to do something big about them. In such cases it can be very nice to have a law step in and declare who is right. If many accept the law’s resolution, peace may be preserved.

Gossip is dangerous. This has long been known, as the bible quotes above indicate. People can be greatly harmed by others talking about them, so sometimes gossip leads to very big complaints. Through most of the history of formal law, dangerous gossip was dealt with simply: law banned saying bad things about others. Of course this rule wasn’t always or even usually enforced – it was expensive to make a legal complaint. And there were various conditions and exceptions. But the basic idea was simple: keep people from hurting each other.

Our modern Western world thinks differently. We idealize conversation, and letting people say what they think. So we no longer have law punish people for saying bad things about each other, especially true things. We instead tell folks to tough it, that true mean words don’t excuse violent retaliation. Sometimes we see people hurt others greatly, out of malice, and we refuse to stop them. We sacrifice such victims on the altar of our respect for conversation.

Of course there are good things to say about gossip. By freely sharing info, we might aggregate it, and all learn the sum of what we all know. For example, we might learn to identify people who are mean or uncooperative, helping us to avoid them, and giving them stronger incentives to cooperate. While such social pressure to please aren’t always good, they seem good on average.

Blackmail is basically a threat of gossip; “if you don’t pay, I’ll gossip.” So almost all the things people don’t like about blackmail are things they don’t like about gossip. Someone could, out of selfish motives, say something that hurts someone else. If you don’t like this scenario, it is mainly something you don’t like about a freedom to gossip.

Yes, in addition to harmful gossip, blackmail can also involve money, and a threat. But money-inspired threats happen anytime parties haggle over a price, and few folks get worked up over that. If people are free to buy or not buy, and to sell or not sell, why not let them make threats about the price they’ll accept? Similarly, if people are free to gossip or not gossip as they prefer, why not let them haggle over the price of their gossip?

Yes, some prices are seen by many as unfair or immoral. Many don’t think the price of water or gas should rise in a crisis, and think the cash price of sex, babies, and organs should always be zero. But the arguments folks give for those cases don’t apply well to gossip — why exactly should the cash price of gossip always be zero?

Now a world that allows blackmail about gossip, i.e., haggling over the price of gossip, isn’t exactly the same as a world with only gossip. Legal blackmail should increase the incentives to discover embarrassing info, and thus the expected penalties from embarrassing actions. But these are mostly just stronger versions of the effects of gossip without blackmail, and they are effects we think we mostly like about gossip.

If we don’t want to discourage certain embarrassing actions, then why allow gossip about them? We could extend our privacy laws, and declare some topics off limits to casual conversation. But for topics where we do want conversation, because it is on average good to discourage people from doing embarrassing things, why not also allow blackmail?

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Blackmail History

The most common way academics study regulation is to seek models under which such regulation could be efficient (or moral), and to seek empirical data on details of current local regulatory practice to distinguish such models. But this standard approach tends to neglect both models where people personally gain by supporting inefficient (or immoral) regulation, and the patterns of such regulations across diverse cultures, times, and topics. Some other day I’ll elaborate on this general point. Today I’ll apply my own advice to blackmail, and consider the history of blackmail law.

Some say that we ban blackmail today in order to encourage more gossip. Others say blackmail law is driven mainly by elites wanting to protect themselves. Relevant to both of these theories is the fact that both blackmail and negative gossip were illegal in ancient Rome. (Details below.) But only regarding elites. Unless you had a special privilege, it was illegal to say something embarrassing about an elite. It wasn’t until the last few centuries that law has allowed gossip that says bad true things about elites, and then to compensate we greatly increased blackmail penalties. So at least regarding the pre-modern era, the elite protection theory gets a boost, while the gossip support theory looks weak. This data also helps one understand how the ancients could affirm such high moral standards – few were allowed to point out elite hypocrisy.

Foragers relied heavily on gossip – “leaders” and “legal guilt and punishment” were determined almost entirely by informal uncontrolled gossip. Farmer elites tried to crush gossip as a social force competing with their edicts, though gossip stayed stronger among elites. In the modern world we have returned more to forager values, and so we more empower and rely on gossip, though usually within limits. We allow juries to decide legal trials, though we limit outside gossip influence on jurors. Via democracy, public opinion now picks top leaders, and mass media is recently getting comfortable saying bad things about leaders’ personal lives. Via a celebrity and media culture, gossip chooses many other elites. And we also allow freer speech, including saying embarrassing things about elites.

Forager values seem less enamored of money, since a money-based relation is often framed as a kind of domination, and for foragers domination is illicit. So while the modern world more embraces decentralized conversation, we seem to often be wary of letting base money and commerce influence conversation, which we idealize. For example, there is today widespread wariness of paid advertising, open campaign finance, and of for profit firms controlling schools and media, and publishing research. While this wariness doesn’t usually lead to prohibitions of money interacting with gossip, it makes people more willing to accept such prohibitions.

Blackmail can be framed as a base thing, money, polluting both our idealized conversation, and our idealized private lives. Distaste for pollution of high things by low, together with strong elite distate for blackmail, which mostly targets them, seems enough to explain why blackmail remains illegal.

Some quotes on blackmail law history: Continue reading "Blackmail History" »

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