Monthly Archives: January 2010

Telescope Effect

Even if 10 deaths do not make us feel 10 times as sad as a single death, shouldn’t we feel at least twice as sad? There is disturbing evidence that shows we may actually care less. … Paul Slovic … asked two groups of volunteers shortly after the Rwandan genocide to imagine they were officials in charge of a humanitarian rescue effort. Both groups were told their money could save 4,500 lives at a refugee camp, but one group was told the refugee camp had 11,000 people, whereas the other group was told the refugee camp had 250,000 people. Slovic found that people were much more reluctant to spend the money on the large camp than they were to spend the money on the small camp. … Would they rather spend $10 million to save 10,000 lives from a disease that caused 15,000 deaths a year, or save 20,000 lives from a disease that killed 290,000 people a year? Overwhelmingly, volunteers preferred to spend money saving the 10,000 lives rather than the 20,000 lives. …
Slovic once told volunteers about a 7-year-old girl in Mali who was starving and in need of help. They were given a certain amount of money and asked how much they were willing to spend to help her. On average, people gave half their money to help the girl. … One group of volunteers was asked whether they would give money to the little girl; another was asked whether they would donate money to the little boy. A third group of volunteers was told about both the boy and the girl and asked how much they were willing to give. People gave the same amount of money when told about either the boy or the girl. But when the children were presented together, the volunteers gave less.

Even if 10 deaths do not make us feel 10 times as sad as a single death, shouldn’t we feel at least twice as sad? There is disturbing evidence that shows we may actually care less. … Paul Slovic … asked two groups of volunteers shortly after the Rwandan genocide to imagine they were officials in charge of a humanitarian rescue effort. Both groups were told their money could save 4,500 lives at a refugee camp, but one group was told the refugee camp had 11,000 people, whereas the other group was told the refugee camp had 250,000 people. Slovic found that people were much more reluctant to spend the money on the large camp than they were to spend the money on the small camp. … Would they rather spend $10 million to save 10,000 lives from a disease that caused 15,000 deaths a year, or save 20,000 lives from a disease that killed 290,000 people a year? Overwhelmingly, volunteers preferred to spend money saving the 10,000 lives rather than the 20,000 lives. …

Slovic once told volunteers about a 7-year-old girl in Mali who was starving and in need of help. They were given a certain amount of money and asked how much they were willing to spend to help her. On average, people gave half their money to help the girl. … One group of volunteers was asked whether they would give money to the little girl; another was asked whether they would donate money to the little boy. A third group of volunteers was told about both the boy and the girl and asked how much they were willing to give. People gave the same amount of money when told about either the boy or the girl. But when the children were presented together, the volunteers gave less.

More here.  If you want to care more about distant victims, set aside your mental image of a large tragedy, focus your mind on one particular victim, and open your heart.  If you want to care less, instead of thinking about any one victim, try to visualize a much larger group of similar victims.  Now here’s the key question: do you want to care more or less?  Not sure? See which image you put in your mind, long enough to act on it.

This puzzles me a bit re near-far analysis.  It suggests we help distant victims more in near mode, even though far mode is where we more express abstract ideals we want others to see.  Do we not actually want others to think we help distant victims?

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Shut Up Or Else

The overwhelmingly liberal tilt of university professors has been explained by everything from outright bias to higher I.Q. scores. … A pair of sociologists think they may have an answer: typecasting. … The academic profession “has acquired such a strong reputation for liberalism and secularism that over the last 35 years few politically or religiously conservative students, but many liberal and secular ones, have formed the aspiration to become professors,” they write in the paper, “Why Are Professors Liberal?” That is especially true of their own field, sociology. … To Mr. Gross, accusations by conservatives of bias and student brainwashing are self-defeating. “The irony is that the more conservatives complain about academia’s liberalism,” he said, “the more likely it’s going to remain a bastion of liberalism.”

More here.  ”Shut up about this imbalance or it’ll be worse.”  Can you imagine a sociologist recommending this response to a huge imbalance elsewhere, say a [disapproved] gender, ethnic, or sexual preference imbalance among executives, top colleges, country clubs, or political offices?   But when it comes to imbalances in their own profession, …  HT Tyler.

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Two Anecdotes

In December 2008, two seemingly unrelated events occurred. The first was the release of Stephen Greenspan’s book, Annals of Gullibility: Why We Get Duped and How to Avoid It. Greenspan, a professor of psychology, … discussed gullibility in fields including finance, academia, and the law. … The second was the exposure of the greatest Ponzi scheme in history, run by Bernard Madoff, which cost its unsuspecting investors in excess of $60 billion. … The irony is that Greenspan, who is bright and well regarded, lost 30 percent of his retirement savings in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
At conference dealing with spine surgery, a surgeon presented the case of a female patient with a herniated disc in her neck and pain that was caused by a pinched nerve. She had already failed typical conservative treatments such as physical therapy, medication, and waiting it out.
The surgeon asked the [doc] audience to vote on a couple of choices for surgery. The first was the newer anterior approach, where the surgeon removes the entire disc, replaces it with a bone plug, aim fuses the discs. The vast majority of the hands shot up. The second choice was the older posterior approach, where the surgeon removes only the portion of the disc that is compressing the nerve. No fusion is required because the procedure leaves most of the disc intact. Only a few audience members raised their hands.
The speaker then asked the audience, which was almost entirely male, “What if this patient is your wife?” The show of hands was reversed for the same two choices. The main reason is that the amount surgeons are paid for the newer and more complicated procedure is typically several times what they’d receive for the older procedure.

On the impotence of book learning:

In December 2008, two seemingly unrelated events occurred. The first was the release of Stephen Greenspan’s book, Annals of Gullibility: Why We Get Duped and How to Avoid It. Greenspan, a professor of psychology, … discussed gullibility in fields including finance, academia, and the law. … The second was the exposure of the greatest Ponzi scheme in history, run by Bernard Madoff, which cost its unsuspecting investors in excess of $60 billion. … The irony is that Greenspan, who is bright and well regarded, lost 30 percent of his retirement savings in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.

On distorted doc incentives:

At conference dealing with spine surgery, a surgeon presented the case of a female patient with a herniated disc in her neck and pain that was caused by a pinched nerve. She had already failed typical conservative treatments such as physical therapy, medication, and waiting it out.

The surgeon asked the [doc] audience to vote on a couple of choices for surgery. The first was the newer anterior approach, where the surgeon removes the entire disc, replaces it with a bone plug, aim fuses the discs. The vast majority of the hands shot up. The second choice was the older posterior approach, where the surgeon removes only the portion of the disc that is compressing the nerve. …

The speaker then asked the audience, which was almost entirely male, “What if this patient is your wife?” The show of hands was reversed for the same two choices. The main reason is that the amount surgeons are paid for the newer and more complicated procedure is typically several times what they’d receive for the older procedure.

More here.  I’m actually surprised by this doc story; I’ve heard that docs over-consume med like everyone else.
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Subsidize Experiences

Psychologists confirm economist’ findings that experiences like vacations seem less positional than objects like TVs and cameras.:

When it comes to spending disposable income, experiential purchases tend to make people happier than material purchases (Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003). But why are experiences more satisfying? We propose that the evaluation of experiences tends to be less comparative than that of material possessions, such that potentially invidious comparisons have less impact on satisfaction with experiences than with material possessions. Support for this contention was obtained in 8 studies. We found that participants were less satisfied with their material purchases because they were more likely to ruminate about unchosen options (Study 1); that participants tended to maximize when selecting material goods and satisfice when selecting experiences (Study 2); that participants examined unchosen material purchases more than unchosen experiential purchases (Study 3); and that, relative to experiences, participants’ satisfaction with their material possessions was undermined more by comparisons to other available options (Studies 4 and 5A), to the same option at a different price (Studies 5B and 6), and to the purchases of other individuals (Study 5C). Our results suggest that experiential purchase decisions are easier to make and more conducive to well-being.

More here and here.

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AI In Far And Near View

Looking far into the distance, your eyes often see a sharp boundary between earth and sky. But if you were to travel to that furthest part of earth your eye can now see, you may not find a sharp boundary there.  Far mode simplifies, not only suppressing detail, but making you think detail is unimportant.  If you saw two ships battling on the horizon, you’d be too tempted to expect the bigger ship to win.

From a distance, future techs also seem overly simple and hence disruptive.  If in 1672 you had seen Verbiest’s steam-powered vehicle, you might have imagined that the first nation with cheap capable cars could conquer the world.  After all, they might build tanks and troop transports, and literally run circles around enemy troops.  But while having somewhat better cars did sometimes help some nations, it was far from an overwhelming advantage. Cars slowly gained in cost, ability, and number; there was no particular day when one nation had vastly more capable cars.

Similar scenarios have played out for a great many techs, like rockets, radios, lasers, or computers.  While one might imagine from afar that the difference between none of a tech and a “full” version would give a dramatic advantage, actual progress was more incremental, reducing team differences in tech levels.  Overall differences in wealth and tech capability were usually better explanations for the advantages some nations had over others.

The first far images of nanotech were also simple, stark, and disruptive.  They imagined one team could quickly and reliably assemble, from cheap plentiful feedstocks, large quantities of a large set of big atom arrangements, while other teams had near-current capabilities.  In this scenario, the first first team might well conquer the world, or accidentally destroy it via “grey goo.”

The nanotech transition seems less disruptive, however, if we see more detail, and imagine a series of incrementally more capable assemblers, able to build larger objects, faster, more reliably, from more types of feedstocks, using more kinds of local chemical bonds, at a wider range of assembler-assembled angles, and so on.  After all, we already have ribosome assemblers, with a very limited range of feeds, bonds, angles, etc.  Each new type of assembler would lower the cost of making a new class of objects.

Far images of artificial intelligence (AI) can also be overly stark.  If you saw minds as having a single relevant ”intelligence” parameter, with humans unable but machines able to change their parameter, you might well rue the day a machine whizzed past the human level.  Especially if you thought God-levels might follow a month later, and if you thought this parameter’s typical value was what determined a team’s power. Continue reading "AI In Far And Near View" »

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Diffusion By Learning

Innovation is terribly important; it is why we are rich.  But how exactly does innovation happen?  An awful lot of innovation seems to happen via diffusion, i.e., spreading one at a time via a network of who knows who.  A recent AER paper considers three possible diffusion processes:

[Consider] situations where the [innovation diffusion] dynamics are driven from within; that is, there are internal feedback effects from prior to future adopters.  …
1. Contagion. People adopt when they come in contact with others who have already adopted; that is, innovations spread much like epidemics.
2. Social influence. People adopt when enough other people in the group have adopted; that is, innovations spread by a conformity motive.
3. Social learning. People adopt once they see enough empirical evidence to convince them that the innovation is worth adopting, where the evidence is generated by the outcomes among prior adopters. Individuals may adopt at different times due to differences in their prior beliefs, amount of information gathered, and idiosyncratic costs.

Social learning is consistent with the observed pattern of diffusion of hybrid corn, although we cannot say that it was the sole explanatory factor. We can also say with some confidence, however, that inertia and contagion were probably not the sole explanatory factors, and given Griliches’s findings neither was social influence.

I’ve been watching this innovation process up close for several years, as prediction markets slowly spread through the corporate world.  One might hope that we had central technology experts, and once they approved a new tech, everyone would adopt it.  No way.  People don’t believe something works until they’ve seen it work in something pretty close to their situation.  A media story about something far away just doesn’t say much.

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Innovation Levers

Innovation is terribly important; it is why we are rich.  We know innovation is caused by economic activity, but if we knew which activities more promoted innovation, we’d want to subsidize them.  Three recent papers suggests we should prefer many small industries each dominated by a few firms, and prefer private research in processes of capital intensive industries, especially chem/drug and comp/electronics.

First, a review article says R&D spending is more effective for process over product, private over public, and basic over applied:

A distinction is made between R&D directed toward invention of new methods of production (process R&D) and R&D directed towards the creation of new and improved goods (product R&D). … Most studies find a higher rate of return for process as compared to product R&D.  … A lower rate of return (or a less significant one) is reported by many authors to public rather than private R&D, both at the private and social level … A higher return is also generally reported on basic R&D as opposed to applied or development. … Social returns, these are almost always estimated to be substantially greater than the private returns.

Second, it seems that larger firms are just less efficient at research, especially in drugs and electronics:

While the empirical literature fails to generate a consensus view, a number of studies report that the patent yield from R&D expenditures falls with firm size.

Third, Shawn Miller, a student in my I/O class last semester, did a great paper predicting patents by industry.  He found more (patent) innovation in industries that are smaller, more capital intensive, and more concentrated among a few firms.  Chemical, computer, drug, and electronic industries were especially innovative.  Here is Miller’s main table:

RnD

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States Sting Status

We usually take control as a strong marker of status; those who give orders have higher status than those who take orders.  So, for example, bosses are reluctant to oversee better paid subordinates, and teens chafe under the control of their parents and teachers, even when their lives are otherwise comfortable.
People care about the form of government they live under not only because different forms of government have different chances of leading to peace, prosperity, etc.  People also care about how governments more directly influences their status.  For example, in addition to or setting aside our beliefs about which forms of government lead to which other outcomes, I suspect most of us prefer:
democracy to autarchy, as it gives us more illusion of control.
proportional representation, as gives more control over the person we pick
equal votes per person, as otherwise others have more votes than you
the state to be controlled by a group we identify with, so we seem in control
stigma be attached to welfare given to groups we don’t identify with
more regulation of competing high status, to bring them down to us
more support of affiliated high status, to bring us up with as they rise
laws not treat us like children or fools, as that degrades us
I suspect such status issues drive our actual choice of government forms more often than we like to admit.
Thinking along these lines, I was wondering about the status effects of something like futarchy — what if every time the government considered a policy, you had the option to bet for or against that policy, and such bets influenced policy?
Yes, you might still have to suffer the status-reducing indignity of being ruled by foolish policies chosen by clueless folks who in a just world would be considered your inferiors.  But you would always know that you had the option to have a large influence, via bets, on those policies, an influence far out of proportion to your fraction of the population.  You would also know that you could, via bets, arrange to be paid lots of money when those policies went badly, just as you had predicted.  Would this raise your status, relative to only influencing policy via your tiny fractional vote, and then just having to live with the consequences?
Setting aside whether this betting system would actually choose good policies producing peace, prosperity, etc., the question I’m asking in this post is if this betting system might substantially shrink the status sting of the state.  Yes this would not fully assuage a libertarian’s outrage at being subject to policies he did not (recently) choose, but would it be a substantial step in that direction?

We usually see control as a marker of status; those who give orders have higher status than those who take orders.  So, for example, bosses are reluctant to oversee better-paid subordinates, and teens chafe under the control of parents and teachers, even when their lives are otherwise comfortable.  People also hate or love their governments in part because how it makes them feel controlled by others, or in control of others.

More generally, people care about the governments they live under not only because different types of government have different chances of leading to peace, prosperity, etc. People also care about how governments more directly influence their status. For example, in addition to wanting governments that induce other outcomes like peace or prosperity, I suspect most of us prefer:

  1. governments with forms like those of recent high status regimes,
  2. to be part of large rich powerful empires, since those are high status,
  3. democracy over autarchy, as it gives us more illusion of control,
  4. proportional representation, as we then more control who represents us,
  5. equal votes per person, as otherwise others have more votes than us,
  6. states controlled by groups we identify with, so we seem in control,
  7. stigma attached to assistance given groups we don’t identify with,
  8. more regulation of competing high status folks, to bring them down to us,
  9. more support of affiliated high status folks, to lift us as they rise, and
  10. laws that treat them but not us like children, as that degrades folks.

Such status issues may drive our choice of government forms more often than we like to admit.  So when trying to design good government, we need to take such status affects into account, so that our designs can be attractive and stable.  Thinking along these lines, I was wondering about the status effects of something like futarchy — what if every time the government considered a policy, you had the option to bet for or against that policy, and such bets influenced policy?

Yes, you might still have to suffer the status-reducing indignity of being ruled by foolish policies chosen by dimwits who in a just world would be considered your inferiors. But you would always know that, via bets, you had the option of a large influence on those policies, far out of proportion to your fraction of the population.  You would also know that you could, via bets, arrange to be paid lots when those policies went badly, just as you had predicted.  Would this raise your status, relative to only influencing policy via your tiny fractional vote, and then just having to live with the consequences?

Setting aside whether this betting system would actually choose good policies producing peace, prosperity, etc., the question I’m asking in this post is if this betting system might substantially shrink the status sting of the state.  Yes this would not fully assuage a libertarian’s outrage at being subject to policies he did not (recently) choose, but would it be a substantial step in that direction?

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Celebrating Compromise

Crapgame:  Then make a DEAL!
Big Joe:  What kind of deal?
Crapgame:  A DEAL, deal! Maybe the guy’s a Republican. “Business is business,” right?   [Famous scene from 1970 movie Kelly's Heroes]

Invictus is a decent movie – at 80 years old Clint Eastwood is still in top form.  More interesting is that Invictus, like Kelly’s Heroes, is a rare movie celebrating compromise, the key virtue of “dealism,” or economic efficiency.

The movie shows Nelson Mandela, new black leader of previously white-run South Africa, trying to unite suspicious whites with blacks eager for revenge.  Of course Mandela achieves this not by touting the advantages of peace and prosperity, but via pride in beating a common enemy: the South African rugby team wins the world cup.  The title of the movie comes from a poem that inspired Mandella in prison, a poem all about defiance, self-respect, and not a whiff of compromise.

All of which shows just how hard it is to inspire passion for compromise; sadly, no one goes to the barricades for efficiency.  The best this movie can offer is that peace and compromise can help you crush your enemies into smoldering ruins.  Whee.

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Status Audit

Breathing is very important to us.  Even so, it is hard to say that we do much of what we do just to breathe.  Instead, we adjust what we do to make sure we can breathe.  We do this mostly unconsciously, but we do it.

Similarly, status is very important to us.  But it looks bad to do things to directly for status; that seems too desperate.  So usually we have other conscious motivations, and unconsciously adjust our behavior to manage status. This lets us avoid showing or seeing how much status matters to us.

With this in mind, I thought I’d try a quick status audit of my blogging behavior, using this fascinating list of status moves.  I’ve listed the 41 of them that plausibly apply below.  Considering my usual blogging style, I’ve tried to code as red moves where what I tend to do or not do typically raises my status or lower others’, and as blue moves that typically lower my status or raise others’.  Black moves were harder to code.

A. High-status behaviors

  1. Having no visible reaction to what the other person said.
  2. Speaking in complete sentences.
  3. Talking matter-of-factly about things that the other person finds displeasing or offensive.
  4. Speaking authoritatively, with certainty.
  5. Giving or withholding permission.
  6. Evaluating other people’s work.
  7. Speaking cryptically.
  8. Being surrounded by an entourage. Continue reading "Status Audit" »
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