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	<title>Comments on: Hewitt on Futarchy</title>
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	<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html</link>
	<description>Overcoming Bias is economist Robin Hanson’s blog, on honesty, signaling, disagreement, forecasting, and the far future.</description>
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		<title>By: Paul Hewitt</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440441</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Hewitt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jan 2010 21:47:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440441</guid>
		<description>In response to your comment on my blog...

I agree with most of your comments, Robin, particularly as they relate to financial markets.  However, the types of markets contemplated under futarchy differ from financial markets in terms of their informational efficiency (at least that&#039;s my opinion).

I&#039;m not saying that the information accuracy drops to zero, but I am saying that it drops to a very low, or at least an unreliable level.  Consequently, for the long-term markets, the market aggregates a lot of guesses, as opposed to reasoned opinions.

Perhaps we differ in our beliefs about market efficiency of decision markets.  

In terms of distinguishing between innovative ideas worth trying and others, I draw the line with a reasonable cost-benefit analysis.  Rather than have faith that a market will &quot;work&quot;, even when logic tells you it won&#039;t (a la Miracle on 34th Street), I need to know there is a logical reason why it should (or at least could) work.  Then, if the potential benefits are likely to exceed the cost of trying, give it a try.

Maybe, we need to take a closer look at prediction market efficiency.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In response to your comment on my blog&#8230;</p>
<p>I agree with most of your comments, Robin, particularly as they relate to financial markets.  However, the types of markets contemplated under futarchy differ from financial markets in terms of their informational efficiency (at least that&#8217;s my opinion).</p>
<p>I&#8217;m not saying that the information accuracy drops to zero, but I am saying that it drops to a very low, or at least an unreliable level.  Consequently, for the long-term markets, the market aggregates a lot of guesses, as opposed to reasoned opinions.</p>
<p>Perhaps we differ in our beliefs about market efficiency of decision markets.  </p>
<p>In terms of distinguishing between innovative ideas worth trying and others, I draw the line with a reasonable cost-benefit analysis.  Rather than have faith that a market will &#8220;work&#8221;, even when logic tells you it won&#8217;t (a la Miracle on 34th Street), I need to know there is a logical reason why it should (or at least could) work.  Then, if the potential benefits are likely to exceed the cost of trying, give it a try.</p>
<p>Maybe, we need to take a closer look at prediction market efficiency.</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Hewitt</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440409</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Hewitt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jan 2010 18:29:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440409</guid>
		<description>I have posted a concluding comment on my blog, here:

http://torontopm.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/the-future-of-futarchy/#comment-148

Robin, thank you for continuing the discussion.  Good luck in The Debate!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have posted a concluding comment on my blog, here:</p>
<p><a href="http://torontopm.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/the-future-of-futarchy/#comment-148" rel="nofollow">http://torontopm.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/the-future-of-futarchy/#comment-148</a></p>
<p>Robin, thank you for continuing the discussion.  Good luck in The Debate!</p>
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		<title>By: Robin Hanson</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440179</link>
		<dc:creator>Robin Hanson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 11:43:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440179</guid>
		<description>Hal, on reflection the minimal change and recursive elements of futarchy already deal with this problem of what to do when markets are silent.  Presumably the new futarchy regime would start out with all the old rules, plus the one new rule that markets can set all policy.  Legislatures would thus continue to be able to pass bills that change policy until markets approved a specific futarchy proposal to take this power away from legislatures.  If such a proposal passed, it would be because speculators expected that the harm from continued legislature policy changes would outweigh its benefits.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hal, on reflection the minimal change and recursive elements of futarchy already deal with this problem of what to do when markets are silent.  Presumably the new futarchy regime would start out with all the old rules, plus the one new rule that markets can set all policy.  Legislatures would thus continue to be able to pass bills that change policy until markets approved a specific futarchy proposal to take this power away from legislatures.  If such a proposal passed, it would be because speculators expected that the harm from continued legislature policy changes would outweigh its benefits.</p>
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		<title>By: Debate is raging between Robin Hanson and the futarchy critics &#124; Midas Oracle .ORG</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440177</link>
		<dc:creator>Debate is raging between Robin Hanson and the futarchy critics &#124; Midas Oracle .ORG</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 10:10:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440177</guid>
		<description>[...] Paul Hewitt comments on Robin Hanson&#8217;s blog. Many exchanges with Robin Hanson. Read it [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Paul Hewitt comments on Robin Hanson&#8217;s blog. Many exchanges with Robin Hanson. Read it [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Hal Finney</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440173</link>
		<dc:creator>Hal Finney</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 06:46:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440173</guid>
		<description>If the legislation took things too far then a futarchy proposal to reverse their recent moves would rise above the noise and win. But then maybe you&#039;d have to have some extra rule to prevent this back and forth pattern wastefully repeating. It gets pretty complicated, and we don&#039;t know if the flat distribution would be real or not.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If the legislation took things too far then a futarchy proposal to reverse their recent moves would rise above the noise and win. But then maybe you&#8217;d have to have some extra rule to prevent this back and forth pattern wastefully repeating. It gets pretty complicated, and we don&#8217;t know if the flat distribution would be real or not.</p>
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		<title>By: Robin Hanson</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440161</link>
		<dc:creator>Robin Hanson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 23:46:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440161</guid>
		<description>Hal, I fear that would allow the legislature to do pretty much anything they wanted, as long as they did it in small enough steps.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hal, I fear that would allow the legislature to do pretty much anything they wanted, as long as they did it in small enough steps.</p>
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		<title>By: Hal Finney</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440155</link>
		<dc:creator>Hal Finney</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 21:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440155</guid>
		<description>Maybe it would be interesting to consider a hybrid of futarchy and conventional legislatures, to deal with Paul&#039;s &quot;flat distribution&quot; problem. As I understand it, the issue is that markets in practice may be unable to penetrate the fog of uncertainty regarding the semi distant future, and therefore cannot effectively differentiate the expected long-term effects of various policies. This leads to market prices that are equal for various proposals, to within some noise term, preventing effective policy action.

Imagine that we had the usual futarchy rules that clearly superior policies are implemented automatically (ie policies where the expected improvement exceeds some noise threshold). But, in addition a legislature would be permitted to enact policies which made things no worse, again to within a noise delta. If it does turn out that in some policy areas, the market ends up scratching its collective head when it tries to predict the future, the legislature would then be able to take action.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Maybe it would be interesting to consider a hybrid of futarchy and conventional legislatures, to deal with Paul&#8217;s &#8220;flat distribution&#8221; problem. As I understand it, the issue is that markets in practice may be unable to penetrate the fog of uncertainty regarding the semi distant future, and therefore cannot effectively differentiate the expected long-term effects of various policies. This leads to market prices that are equal for various proposals, to within some noise term, preventing effective policy action.</p>
<p>Imagine that we had the usual futarchy rules that clearly superior policies are implemented automatically (ie policies where the expected improvement exceeds some noise threshold). But, in addition a legislature would be permitted to enact policies which made things no worse, again to within a noise delta. If it does turn out that in some policy areas, the market ends up scratching its collective head when it tries to predict the future, the legislature would then be able to take action.</p>
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		<title>By: ERIC</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440144</link>
		<dc:creator>ERIC</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 18:42:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440144</guid>
		<description>&quot;...there is...no understanding as to why&quot; ... is this the narrative fallacy at work here? I think there are plenty of explanations for a failure but agreement is limited.

Isn&#039;t the point that a robust prediction market would incorporate &quot;alternative forecasting methods&quot;? To me, the point of a market price is that it incorporates &quot;everything&quot;. Prediction markets share/uncover information quite well, don&#039;t they?

If you think company XYZ is worth $20/share and the market value is $10 or $30, doesn&#039;t that give you pause to think maybe you&#039;ve missed something? If nothing else, is this not a major benefit of any type of market...you are forced to view a reality you may not see otherwise given your biases?

Isn&#039;t the hedging benefit of markets worth something too? Unless hedging is not important to you at all. If it is, how could it be done easily outside of a market?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;&#8230;there is&#8230;no understanding as to why&#8221; &#8230; is this the narrative fallacy at work here? I think there are plenty of explanations for a failure but agreement is limited.</p>
<p>Isn&#8217;t the point that a robust prediction market would incorporate &#8220;alternative forecasting methods&#8221;? To me, the point of a market price is that it incorporates &#8220;everything&#8221;. Prediction markets share/uncover information quite well, don&#8217;t they?</p>
<p>If you think company XYZ is worth $20/share and the market value is $10 or $30, doesn&#8217;t that give you pause to think maybe you&#8217;ve missed something? If nothing else, is this not a major benefit of any type of market&#8230;you are forced to view a reality you may not see otherwise given your biases?</p>
<p>Isn&#8217;t the hedging benefit of markets worth something too? Unless hedging is not important to you at all. If it is, how could it be done easily outside of a market?</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Hewitt</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440139</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Hewitt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 16:28:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440139</guid>
		<description>No, there is no way of knowing in advance.  This places added importance on being &quot;right&quot; most often.  In Enterprise Prediction Markets, we can obtain &lt;strong&gt;some &lt;/strong&gt;information to make this assessment.

If it turns out that the distribution of forecasts is too flat, it may be that it is not possible to forecast that particular metric (perhaps by any known method).  Maybe the only alternative is to abandon that metric and choose another (or others) that can be measured and forecast to some reasonable level of accuracy.

Related to the issue of accuracy, how does futarchy handle the case where the decision markets &quot;clearly&quot; indicate a positive policy effect, but the prediction market distributions are very flat?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No, there is no way of knowing in advance.  This places added importance on being &#8220;right&#8221; most often.  In Enterprise Prediction Markets, we can obtain <strong>some </strong>information to make this assessment.</p>
<p>If it turns out that the distribution of forecasts is too flat, it may be that it is not possible to forecast that particular metric (perhaps by any known method).  Maybe the only alternative is to abandon that metric and choose another (or others) that can be measured and forecast to some reasonable level of accuracy.</p>
<p>Related to the issue of accuracy, how does futarchy handle the case where the decision markets &#8220;clearly&#8221; indicate a positive policy effect, but the prediction market distributions are very flat?</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Hewitt</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/01/hewitt-on-futarchy.html#comment-440138</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Hewitt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 16:08:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=21327#comment-440138</guid>
		<description>The amount I would be willing to bet would depend on the assumptions you would impose on these hypothetical markets.  If you decide to make the manipulators wear signs indicating the direction and strength of their manipulation, I wouldn&#039;t bet very much at all.  

If the manipulators look like you and me (and all of the other traders), I&#039;ll bet the farm they&#039;ll be able to get away with it.  Traders in these markets will have a tough enough time trying to forecast a very complex number.  On top of that, you think they will have the uncanny abilities to identify manipulators, figure out approximately how manipulative they are, and calculate the corrective bets?  Oh yeah, and do so confidently.  I would prefer to confidently bet against such abilities.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The amount I would be willing to bet would depend on the assumptions you would impose on these hypothetical markets.  If you decide to make the manipulators wear signs indicating the direction and strength of their manipulation, I wouldn&#8217;t bet very much at all.  </p>
<p>If the manipulators look like you and me (and all of the other traders), I&#8217;ll bet the farm they&#8217;ll be able to get away with it.  Traders in these markets will have a tough enough time trying to forecast a very complex number.  On top of that, you think they will have the uncanny abilities to identify manipulators, figure out approximately how manipulative they are, and calculate the corrective bets?  Oh yeah, and do so confidently.  I would prefer to confidently bet against such abilities.</p>
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