Comments on: Reply to Caplan

By: Vichy

Vichy — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 21:04:49 +0000

So for pure economic efficiency to be world utility maximizing, you would have to agree with this weighting, which implies that ceterus paribus it is far more important to satisfy the desires of those with a lot of wealth, than those with only a little.

Again, with might = right; people with more money will have more access to goods and therefor potential for material satisfaction. This isn’t a problem, it’s a tautology.

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 17:31:13 +0000

Michael, you misunderstand what policies efficiency supports.

By: Michael Sullivan

Michael Sullivan — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 16:03:17 +0000

For economic efficiency to be a good maximizing criteria, you need more than simply that it is good for people to get what they want.

Delong pointed out some time ago that economic efficiency maximizes a world utility function which weights individual utilities in inverse proportion to each individual’s marginal utility of money.

So for pure economic efficiency to be world utility maximizing, you would have to agree with this weighting, which implies that ceterus paribus it is far more important to satisfy the desires of those with a lot of wealth, than those with only a little.

That seems like a very strange and undesirable value system to me, so it’s hard for me to jump on the economic efficiency as utility maximization bandwagon. In fact, it strikes me as a fairly devastating critique of the “economic freedom über alles” attitude of typical self-described libertarians.

By: Vichy

Vichy — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 08:23:37 +0000

Robin Hanson has come up with the least plausible moral principle since “Might makes right”

Am I the only person who finds ‘might = right’ the only plausible principle? I mean, what else would be true if not efficacy?

By: Overcoming Bias : Minimal Morality

Overcoming Bias : Minimal Morality — Sun, 31 May 2009 23:46:04 +0000

[...] Minimal Morality By Robin Hanson · May 29, 2009 6:00 am · Discuss · « Prev · Next » [...]

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Sun, 31 May 2009 22:07:02 +0000

Richard, yes I think you’ve got it. So yes, I must be open to hearing of other equally simple and comprehensive patterns, yes one might argue goodness intuitions are less noisy, and yes they might be especially low noise in particular identifiable situations. But I do think goodness intuitions are usually rather noisy.

By: Richard

Richard — Sun, 31 May 2009 21:45:50 +0000

Ah, I see. You’re effectively arguing as follows: in the easy cases (without conflict, etc.) it’s better for people to get more of what they want. So we should extend this simple rule to the hard cases also, even if it’s not exactly right, since (given “high intuition noise”) any alterations are likely to lead us further away from the truth.

Is that a fair summary?

Critics might then respond by arguing any of the following:

(1) Although this is a simple rule, it is not “the most simple and consistent” way to systematize our intuitions, since it only captures a very few of them. There might be other relatively simple patterns that do a better job. It could be that our preferences tend, in the easy cases, to correlate with some other property, which is the genuine good-maker. (But then the onus is on the critic to produce such a pattern or property.)

(2) It’s less obvious that our intuitions about “goodness” (as opposed to “rightness”) are subject to “high intuition noise”.

(3) Even if there’s lots of “noise” in general, in some particular cases we may still be justified in trusting some refinements [e.g. to exclude malicious and/or 'disowned' desires] to bring us closer to accuracy. (Perhaps certain classes of intuitions, say those that are most widespread and strongly held among reflective persons, are less “noisy”.)

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Sun, 31 May 2009 12:44:19 +0000

Richard, the point was to find the one pattern in our case-specific moral intuitions which is the most simple and consistent. So of course I hoped it would seem non-controversial. The novel part of my analysis is to suggest that in the limit of high intuition noise that we trust only this simple pattern, and accept a measure of goodness derived from this one pattern alone.

By: Richard

Richard — Sun, 31 May 2009 07:16:48 +0000

But does anyone disagree with your weakened conclusion (that “it is usually good for someone to get more of what they want, if everyone else gets the same of what they want, and no other special considerations apply.”)? Why would you even bother arguing for such an uncontroversial claim? As Dagon points out, you’ve bracketed away all of the interesting/contentious questions.

I’m reminded of postmodernists who initially make outrageous claims about the world being socially constructed, but then when pressed retreat to the vacuous claim that our understanding of the world is mediated by our concepts.

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Sat, 30 May 2009 22:19:58 +0000

Jim, yes Bryan treats “morals” differently, but I’m not sure he’d accept that its a matter of definition. My point is that our attitudes toward acts that don’t affect others, if just accepted as our simplest pattern about moral intuitions about goodness, picks out a preference utilitarian approach to goodness.

Dagon, I’m happy to be seen as making a much weaker claim, since I think this weaker claim is sufficient to draw the conclusion I present.