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	<title>Comments on: Political Signaling Theories</title>
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	<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html</link>
	<description>Overcoming Bias is economist Robin Hanson’s blog, on honesty, signaling, disagreement, forecasting, and the far future.</description>
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		<title>By: Women and Drug Legalization &#171; Brad Taylor&#8217;s Blog</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-432984</link>
		<dc:creator>Women and Drug Legalization &#171; Brad Taylor&#8217;s Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2009 02:37:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-432984</guid>
		<description>[...] think that&#8217;s exactly right: women are more likely than men to signal social solidarity through their policy preferences. My guess is that this can be explained with evolutionary theory, but, whatever the reason, it [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] think that&#8217;s exactly right: women are more likely than men to signal social solidarity through their policy preferences. My guess is that this can be explained with evolutionary theory, but, whatever the reason, it [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Seasteading: Homesteading the High Seas</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-429354</link>
		<dc:creator>Seasteading: Homesteading the High Seas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2009 01:33:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-429354</guid>
		<description>[...] of any single vote means political behavior is based on unquestioned biases and is used to signal disapproval of those things they find objectionable. Trying to get our guy into office seems tempting, but the [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] of any single vote means political behavior is based on unquestioned biases and is used to signal disapproval of those things they find objectionable. Trying to get our guy into office seems tempting, but the [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Emily Alexander</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-429257</link>
		<dc:creator>Emily Alexander</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2009 09:36:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-429257</guid>
		<description>They do, and it is very simple: think of it as pickpocketing vs a big bank heist. The task is simpler, so you have less fear of failure.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They do, and it is very simple: think of it as pickpocketing vs a big bank heist. The task is simpler, so you have less fear of failure.</p>
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		<title>By: Preference Falsification and Support for Gay Marriage &#171; Brad Taylor&#8217;s Blog</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-428890</link>
		<dc:creator>Preference Falsification and Support for Gay Marriage &#171; Brad Taylor&#8217;s Blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2009 02:24:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-428890</guid>
		<description>[...] another may be more important. I suspect that public opinion on highly salient issues with strong signalling value tends to be self-reinforcing. A useful framework for thinking about this is Timur Kuran’s [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] another may be more important. I suspect that public opinion on highly salient issues with strong signalling value tends to be self-reinforcing. A useful framework for thinking about this is Timur Kuran’s [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Anthony</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-425001</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2009 19:13:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-425001</guid>
		<description>&lt;em&gt;do people behave more practically and less ideologically for local elections than national ones?&lt;/em&gt;

They do, until some emotive issue comes along. My hometown has recently adopted a school curriculum designed to combat anti-gay bullying.  Despite the number of interesting questions possible to ask about whether this particular curriculum is a good idea, the debate fell into rather predictable, and predictably loud, patterns.  The issue has involved more citizen involvement and more discussion over the past month than has the impending Budget Crisis of Doom (we&#039;re in California).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>do people behave more practically and less ideologically for local elections than national ones?</em></p>
<p>They do, until some emotive issue comes along. My hometown has recently adopted a school curriculum designed to combat anti-gay bullying.  Despite the number of interesting questions possible to ask about whether this particular curriculum is a good idea, the debate fell into rather predictable, and predictably loud, patterns.  The issue has involved more citizen involvement and more discussion over the past month than has the impending Budget Crisis of Doom (we&#8217;re in California).</p>
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		<title>By: Justin Stec</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-424890</link>
		<dc:creator>Justin Stec</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2009 02:20:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-424890</guid>
		<description>With the assumption that not many people are actually knowledgeable of their signaling propensities?  Or, should we assume that people signal after they realize and adopt their preferences, and are then conscious of their signaling.  I think that many people are impressed with certain elements of style and power, and mostly, the way that other people are viewed by an audience, and begin to craft their own sense of identity and belonging along those lines.  Perhaps, also, people signal more strongly or less strongly based on their own perception of their audience at the time, and based on what they think is most important to that audience (even if one person, and even if that one person is signaling back to the first person with the same standards).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With the assumption that not many people are actually knowledgeable of their signaling propensities?  Or, should we assume that people signal after they realize and adopt their preferences, and are then conscious of their signaling.  I think that many people are impressed with certain elements of style and power, and mostly, the way that other people are viewed by an audience, and begin to craft their own sense of identity and belonging along those lines.  Perhaps, also, people signal more strongly or less strongly based on their own perception of their audience at the time, and based on what they think is most important to that audience (even if one person, and even if that one person is signaling back to the first person with the same standards).</p>
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		<title>By: Robin Hanson</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-424789</link>
		<dc:creator>Robin Hanson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 22:23:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-424789</guid>
		<description>Hal, local and national elections can differ in many other ways besides the number of people involved.  The might, for example, have differing sorts of coalitions in conflict, requiring different signals to show loyalty.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hal, local and national elections can differ in many other ways besides the number of people involved.  The might, for example, have differing sorts of coalitions in conflict, requiring different signals to show loyalty.</p>
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		<title>By: Hal Finney</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-424786</link>
		<dc:creator>Hal Finney</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 21:27:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-424786</guid>
		<description>One thing we might look at is whether people behave differently on local vs national-scale political questions. It&#039;s one thing to agitate for universal health care, where your efforts will have no real influence on which national policy is adopted. It&#039;s quite different to attend a school board meeting and advocate that a teacher be fired, or vote on whether your local water district should raise rates to improve water quality. In these local cases, your opinion can be much more influential if you make an effort.

At the same time, even local elections probably involve larger groups than hunter-gatherers. So the question would be, do people behave more practically and less ideologically for local elections than national ones? If so, that would argue against the evpsych explanation, since signaling should be equally as important for groups of a thousand as groups of 100 million. (Since neither size was encountered in the ancestral environment, evolution could not select for different behavior in the two cases).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One thing we might look at is whether people behave differently on local vs national-scale political questions. It&#8217;s one thing to agitate for universal health care, where your efforts will have no real influence on which national policy is adopted. It&#8217;s quite different to attend a school board meeting and advocate that a teacher be fired, or vote on whether your local water district should raise rates to improve water quality. In these local cases, your opinion can be much more influential if you make an effort.</p>
<p>At the same time, even local elections probably involve larger groups than hunter-gatherers. So the question would be, do people behave more practically and less ideologically for local elections than national ones? If so, that would argue against the evpsych explanation, since signaling should be equally as important for groups of a thousand as groups of 100 million. (Since neither size was encountered in the ancestral environment, evolution could not select for different behavior in the two cases).</p>
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		<title>By: Zac Gochenour</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-424757</link>
		<dc:creator>Zac Gochenour</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 08:19:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-424757</guid>
		<description>&quot;Disinterest in politics shows a willingness to defer to whomever wins.&quot;

I disagree.  Disinterest in politics shows an indifference to who wins.  Nearly everyone shows a willingness to defer to whomever wins, except revolutionaries.

Political apathy can signal you are too busy thinking about other things to be bothered by politics.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Disinterest in politics shows a willingness to defer to whomever wins.&#8221;</p>
<p>I disagree.  Disinterest in politics shows an indifference to who wins.  Nearly everyone shows a willingness to defer to whomever wins, except revolutionaries.</p>
<p>Political apathy can signal you are too busy thinking about other things to be bothered by politics.</p>
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		<title>By: Interessantes woanders (2009.05.29) › Immersion I/O</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/05/political-signaling-theories.html#comment-424754</link>
		<dc:creator>Interessantes woanders (2009.05.29) › Immersion I/O</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 04:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.overcomingbias.com/?p=18472#comment-424754</guid>
		<description>[...] Political Signaling Theories [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Political Signaling Theories [...]</p>
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