Comments on: Incentives, Allies Cut Bias http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html Overcoming Bias is economist Robin Hanson’s blog, on honesty, signaling, disagreement, forecasting, and the far future. Sun, 12 Feb 2012 04:20:14 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1.3 By: Grant http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385352 Grant Sat, 04 Apr 2009 00:26:56 +0000 http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385352 We hear a lot about wealth not being a fixed pie. Why don't we hear the same about rationality? We hear a lot about wealth not being a fixed pie. Why don’t we hear the same about rationality?

]]> By: Unnamed http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385351 Unnamed Fri, 03 Apr 2009 22:35:40 +0000 http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385351 Even if it's just about sharing insight, it is interesting that people were receptive to the insight, especially since Kahneman & Tversky had one study that implied that people are not. K&T presented people with <a href="http://empiricalquestion.blogspot.com/2008/12/extensional-versus-intuitive-reasoning.html" rel="nofollow">two arguments</a>, the correct argument explaining why Linda is more likely to be a bank-teller and an incorrect argument saying that she's more likely to be a feminist bank teller because that sounds more like her, and a majority (65%) found the incorrect argument more convincing. Still, this new paper is vastly overstating the implications of their study. They used the transparent within-subjects version of the Linda problem, but the between-subjects version (where each person is asked to consider either "bank teller" or "feminist bank teller," not both) is more like the kind of problems that we run into <a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/beware-detached-detail.html" rel="nofollow">in real life</a>. More generally, the problem is that people think about likelihood in terms of representativeness when they should be thinking extensionally; the conjunction fallacy is just one particularly egregious consequence of that bias. This just shows that there are some cases where groups of people can overcome that problem. Even if it’s just about sharing insight, it is interesting that people were receptive to the insight, especially since Kahneman & Tversky had one study that implied that people are not. K&T presented people with two arguments, the correct argument explaining why Linda is more likely to be a bank-teller and an incorrect argument saying that she’s more likely to be a feminist bank teller because that sounds more like her, and a majority (65%) found the incorrect argument more convincing.

Still, this new paper is vastly overstating the implications of their study. They used the transparent within-subjects version of the Linda problem, but the between-subjects version (where each person is asked to consider either “bank teller” or “feminist bank teller,” not both) is more like the kind of problems that we run into in real life. More generally, the problem is that people think about likelihood in terms of representativeness when they should be thinking extensionally; the conjunction fallacy is just one particularly egregious consequence of that bias. This just shows that there are some cases where groups of people can overcome that problem.

]]> By: Eliezer Yudkowsky http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385350 Eliezer Yudkowsky Fri, 03 Apr 2009 15:22:52 +0000 http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385350 The proportion of wrong answers in groups is not dropping faster than it should - that is, if you assume that any group containing a single insightful responder answers correctly, then the odds are no lower than they should be. In fact they are slightly too high. 58% for singles vs. 48% for pairs vs. 25% for trios. Or with incentives, 33% for singles vs. 13% for pairs vs. 10% for trios. We can't assume an effect of deliberation rather than a sharing of individual insight. The proportion of wrong answers in groups is not dropping faster than it should – that is, if you assume that any group containing a single insightful responder answers correctly, then the odds are no lower than they should be. In fact they are slightly too high. 58% for singles vs. 48% for pairs vs. 25% for trios. Or with incentives, 33% for singles vs. 13% for pairs vs. 10% for trios. We can’t assume an effect of deliberation rather than a sharing of individual insight.

]]> By: Paul Crowley http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385349 Paul Crowley Fri, 03 Apr 2009 14:06:41 +0000 http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/04/incentives-allies-cut-bias.html#comment-385349 The "Linda" example they used has dated quite a lot in the 25 years since Kahneman and Tversky used it. The “Linda” example they used has dated quite a lot in the 25 years since Kahneman and Tversky used it.

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