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	<title>Comments on: Moral uncertainty &#8211; towards a solution?</title>
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	<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html</link>
	<description>Overcoming Bias is economist Robin Hanson’s blog, on honesty, signaling, disagreement, forecasting, and the far future.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 12 Feb 2012 04:20:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Harras</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-673540</link>
		<dc:creator>Harras</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2012 17:48:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-673540</guid>
		<description>It seems that specifying the delegates&#039; informational situation creates a dilemma.

As you write above, we should take the delegates to think that Parliament&#039;s decision is a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A, to avoid giving the majority bloc absolute power.

However, your suggestion generates its own problems (as long as we take the parliament to go with the option with the most votes):

Suppose an issue The Parliament votes on involves options A1, A2, …, An and an additional option X. Suppose further that the great majority of theories in which the agent has credence agree that it is very important to perform one of A1, A2, …, An rather than X. Although all these theories have a different favourite option, which of A1, A2, …, An is performed makes little difference to them.

Now suppose that according to an additional hypothesis in which the agent has relatively little credence, it is best to perform X. 

Because the delegates who favour A1, A2, …, An do not know that what matters is getting the majority, they see no value in coordinating themselves and concentrating their votes on one or a few options to make sure X will not end up getting the most votes. Accordingly, they will all vote for different options. X may then end up being the option with most votes if the agent has slightly more credence in the hypothesis which favours X than in any other individual theory, despite the fact that the agent is almost sure that this option is grossly suboptimal. 

This is clearly the wrong result.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It seems that specifying the delegates&#8217; informational situation creates a dilemma.</p>
<p>As you write above, we should take the delegates to think that Parliament&#8217;s decision is a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A, to avoid giving the majority bloc absolute power.</p>
<p>However, your suggestion generates its own problems (as long as we take the parliament to go with the option with the most votes):</p>
<p>Suppose an issue The Parliament votes on involves options A1, A2, …, An and an additional option X. Suppose further that the great majority of theories in which the agent has credence agree that it is very important to perform one of A1, A2, …, An rather than X. Although all these theories have a different favourite option, which of A1, A2, …, An is performed makes little difference to them.</p>
<p>Now suppose that according to an additional hypothesis in which the agent has relatively little credence, it is best to perform X. </p>
<p>Because the delegates who favour A1, A2, …, An do not know that what matters is getting the majority, they see no value in coordinating themselves and concentrating their votes on one or a few options to make sure X will not end up getting the most votes. Accordingly, they will all vote for different options. X may then end up being the option with most votes if the agent has slightly more credence in the hypothesis which favours X than in any other individual theory, despite the fact that the agent is almost sure that this option is grossly suboptimal. </p>
<p>This is clearly the wrong result.</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-664932</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2012 22:09:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-664932</guid>
		<description>Oops. Just realized this doesn&#039;t matter because the number of &quot;representatives&quot; is proportional to the probability you give the theory of being correct.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oops. Just realized this doesn&#8217;t matter because the number of &#8220;representatives&#8221; is proportional to the probability you give the theory of being correct.</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-655536</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2012 01:33:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-655536</guid>
		<description>I think it&#039;s a decent idea. How do you deal with distinguishing between theories? Is every theory of utilitarianism with different domains of utility different theories or the same?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think it&#8217;s a decent idea. How do you deal with distinguishing between theories? Is every theory of utilitarianism with different domains of utility different theories or the same?</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-655523</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2012 01:28:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-655523</guid>
		<description>I would think this is correct for minds in general, but this might not be true for humans. I think it&#039;s still an open question as to whether you can derive this in principle from neuroscience. (firing rates, etc)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I would think this is correct for minds in general, but this might not be true for humans. I think it&#8217;s still an open question as to whether you can derive this in principle from neuroscience. (firing rates, etc)</p>
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		<title>By: Jacko Palak</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-586118</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacko Palak</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 2011 03:22:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-586118</guid>
		<description>the true purpose of Ramadan - Muhammad was a psychological genius to convince a civilization based in a burning desert to go w.o food and water most of one day, one month a year _for the purpose of encouraging empathy to develop by one&#039;s own painful sensations of lack of food and water that the poor and suffering and unfortunate feel EVERY day of the year!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>the true purpose of Ramadan &#8211; Muhammad was a psychological genius to convince a civilization based in a burning desert to go w.o food and water most of one day, one month a year _for the purpose of encouraging empathy to develop by one&#8217;s own painful sensations of lack of food and water that the poor and suffering and unfortunate feel EVERY day of the year!</p>
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		<title>By: Jacko Palak</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-585808</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacko Palak</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Dec 2011 23:59:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-585808</guid>
		<description>Authentic morality is derived from genuine empathy, not mathematics or reason.  You will never reach moral clarity with reason alone.

And empathy is not pity.  Pity is useless and ugly.  Empathy has nothing in common with pity.   Empathic intelligence reflects on your fundamental being, your emotional sensitivity.  Sensitivity is the key to real intelligence, also - the very fundamental.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Authentic morality is derived from genuine empathy, not mathematics or reason.  You will never reach moral clarity with reason alone.</p>
<p>And empathy is not pity.  Pity is useless and ugly.  Empathy has nothing in common with pity.   Empathic intelligence reflects on your fundamental being, your emotional sensitivity.  Sensitivity is the key to real intelligence, also &#8211; the very fundamental.</p>
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		<title>By: e.b. sarver</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-469701</link>
		<dc:creator>e.b. sarver</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Apr 2011 23:02:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-469701</guid>
		<description>I think that Hans Hermann Hoppe&#039;s Argumentation Ethics provides a solid framework that seems pretty damned irrefutable.  Or, that is, the only way to refute his ideas is by engaging in a Performative Contradiction, making all arguments against it logically false.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think that Hans Hermann Hoppe&#8217;s Argumentation Ethics provides a solid framework that seems pretty damned irrefutable.  Or, that is, the only way to refute his ideas is by engaging in a Performative Contradiction, making all arguments against it logically false.</p>
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		<title>By: Tim Tyler</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-448631</link>
		<dc:creator>Tim Tyler</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Jun 2010 02:02:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-448631</guid>
		<description>Yes: what does it mean for a moral system to be &quot;correct&quot;?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes: what does it mean for a moral system to be &#8220;correct&#8221;?</p>
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		<title>By: michael vassar</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-441484</link>
		<dc:creator>michael vassar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 07:30:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-441484</guid>
		<description>Nick, are you suggesting that the object of our vague concept is itself vague, e.g. that the vagueness here is in the territory not just on the map?  Historically, it seems to me that vague maps have been believed to correspond to vague territories on many occasions but that they have always been found not to.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nick, are you suggesting that the object of our vague concept is itself vague, e.g. that the vagueness here is in the territory not just on the map?  Historically, it seems to me that vague maps have been believed to correspond to vague territories on many occasions but that they have always been found not to.</p>
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		<title>By: Accelerating Future &#187; Assorted Links 1/26/2010</title>
		<link>http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-441477</link>
		<dc:creator>Accelerating Future &#187; Assorted Links 1/26/2010</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 05:00:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://prod.ob.trike.com.au/2009/01/moral-uncertainty-towards-a-solution.html#comment-441477</guid>
		<description>[...] TV&#8217;s Max and Jason on Connecting Science and Culture Patrick Millard: Open Sim Project Nick Bostrom: Moral Uncertainty: Towards a Solution? Humanity+ Conference in London in April Wired: Removing Part of Skull Makes for Better Brain Scans [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] TV&#8217;s Max and Jason on Connecting Science and Culture Patrick Millard: Open Sim Project Nick Bostrom: Moral Uncertainty: Towards a Solution? Humanity+ Conference in London in April Wired: Removing Part of Skull Makes for Better Brain Scans [...]</p>
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