Comments on: Cryonics Is Cool

By: Aaron Agassi

Aaron Agassi — Sun, 10 Oct 2010 04:58:08 +0000

When a very used ship docks into the shipyard, and in the process of overhaul, virtually every plank and nail is replaced, is it the same ship sailing out to sea again? Socrates asserts that the nature of any object or phenomena is determined by participation in abstracts forms. The formal stance enduring as central in modern science, is position that that objects or phenomena are characterized by the dynamic structural arrangement of matter snaking through space-time, not the specific individual particles of which objects or phenomena are comprised at any fleeting moment, that are always in flux. After all, objects such as trees and stones, are merely slower moving phenomena than such rapidly energetic phenomena as flames and tornados. Therefore, indeed, Dr. McCoy can rest assured that indeed he survives beaming up and down between the Starship Enterprise and the planets they visit. But poor distraught Will Riker, much to his/their chagrin, having beamed up twice after only beaming down once, is no longer sui generis.

By: steven

steven — Tue, 16 Dec 2008 17:30:54 +0000

I prefer the original Beavis & Butthead.

By: Cyan

Cyan — Tue, 16 Dec 2008 17:24:03 +0000

nazgulnarsil,

Would you count Star Trek-style teleportation as a strong break too? Was Chief O’Brien a mass murderer? (These questions aren’t asked as conversation stoppers; I’m genuinely curious as to your answer.)

By: nazgulnarsil

nazgulnarsil — Tue, 16 Dec 2008 17:06:26 +0000

Henrik: You’re assuming that i regard a snapshot in time of me to be “me”, what if I am labeling as “me” the entire “snake”* that exists through space-time in this branch? I would regard a break in this snake as death. Does sleep constitute a break? I am increasingly of the opinion that sleep is not *un*consciousness, merely altered consciousness (lucid dreaming research). Therefore, we are conscious the entire time we are alive. but with cryonics, electrical activity in the brain ceases. this seems like a strong break to me.

*if you view all snapshots of your self at once it should form an undulating snake through space-time, beginning at birth and ending at death.

By: Dr. Commonsense

Dr. Commonsense — Sun, 14 Dec 2008 19:33:28 +0000

Is binary identity an assumption or an axiom? What if my *definition* of identity is the specific instantiation of my pattern that is directly connected to all previous such instantiations with no discontinuities?

Why would pursuing the preservation of my identity as per this definition be any less rational than you choosing to pursue the preservation of identity as per yours?

By: Tim Tyler

Tim Tyler — Sun, 14 Dec 2008 16:17:45 +0000

First “em” week, now “cryonics” week? For budding rationalists a few of you folk do seem to believe in some funny stuff.

By: TGGP

TGGP — Sun, 14 Dec 2008 01:58:13 +0000

Seems rather out-of-place for a blog called “Overcoming Bias”.

By: Henrik Jonsson

Henrik Jonsson — Sun, 14 Dec 2008 00:42:43 +0000

Dr. Commonsense, the mistaken assumptions are that your identity is binary – either an entity “is” you, or it isn’t – and that there can be at most only one “of you”. An indistinguishable duplicate of you is you, and you still are you, as well. From there on your experiences diverge, and you both become less “of you” (compared to the snapshot at moment of copying).

There are already many of you in other Everett branches as well as in your past and future compared to the time you read this, so it is probably a good thing to come to terms with the non-binary, non-unitary nature of identity anyways. These entities range from close to 0 in “you-ness” (something very close to not behaving like you at all) up to essentially 1 (e.g. you from 1 second in the past).

By: Manon de Gaillande

Manon de Gaillande — Sun, 14 Dec 2008 00:24:48 +0000

Eliezer’s arguments (no individual particles, consciousness should be detectable) are arguments for patternism.

I claim an exact duplicate of me is me – but we won’t stay the same person for long, we’ll diverge quickly. If you somehow keep us synchrone, they’ll both be me.

By: Dr. Commonsense

Dr. Commonsense — Sun, 14 Dec 2008 00:02:49 +0000

Thank you for your answer Furcas. Just because you and I have been unable to prove that loss of continuity constitutes subjective death, does that make the assertion disproven?

What would it even take to prove or disprove this assertion? Can this assertion be one of those annoying Goedelian axioms that cannot be derived from simpler axioms?

It’s not even clear whether it’s patternism or continuationalism that falls afoul of Occam’s razor: for patternists to be right, there would have to be some mechanism explaining why an exact duplicate of you coexisting with you is not you, but the simple fact of your destruction at the precise moment your duplicate comes online would somehow make it you.

I think the simpler explanation is that it’s not you in either case.