Comments on: Trust But Don’t Verify

By: Scott

Scott — Sun, 26 Oct 2008 01:44:01 +0000

I think saying that people are “willing to pay to not know” is a little misleading. I read through most of the report, and maybe I missed the bit where they are offered the chance to not know for a fee, but it seems the conclusion drawn was “if given the option, people would rather not know, and if they are forced to know are less likely to invest than if given the option or if forced to not know”. Given investing was on average good for the investor this a form of paying – but not in the sense the investor would feel like they are paying.

Whether or not I’ve misinterpreted this though, a very interesting result.

By: michael webster

michael webster — Sat, 25 Oct 2008 01:42:06 +0000

Robin, these links to thought provoking articles -whether I agree the with conclusions it or not- I and many others come to this blog for.

If you stop blogging, to do something more ambitious, please check in from time to time to engage, enrage, and annoy the lower lifes.

By: Doug S.

Doug S. — Fri, 24 Oct 2008 22:07:01 +0000

Stuart: Good point.

“I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!”
“Your winnings, sir.”

By: Eliezer Yudkowsky

Eliezer Yudkowsky — Fri, 24 Oct 2008 17:30:55 +0000

I wonder if this suggests that the rewards/incentives in these studies aren’t large enough? Maybe with more at stake, we wouldn’t find the situation that apparently arises here, where people are seemingly more worried about the emotional cost of knowing they’ve been betrayed, than the dollar cost of the actual betrayal. Or maybe that would persist even to higher stakes.

By: Stuart Armstrong

Stuart Armstrong — Fri, 24 Oct 2008 14:49:00 +0000

Very interesting result.

I would suggest a twist to the next study. From my time as a teacher, I know that there are situations where it’s best to pretend not to see what you did see; if you admited to seeing it, you have to punish it (for the usual “maintaining discipline” reasons), causing aggravation all round.

So would the result persist if the investors could see the result of their trustee’s actions – but could credibly pretend not to have seen them? ie is it the fact that they know, or the fact that they are known to know, that is crucial here?