Comments on: Why Argue Values?

By: Stirling Westrup

Stirling Westrup — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 17:51:06 +0000

I don’t know if I’m having a dumb day, or if this post simply uses words with definitions that are very different than what I assume.

In any case, I cannot even work out the structure of the argument given here, never mind whether I agree with it or not. As far as I can tell, its gibberish.

This has happened in previous posts and I’ve usually been able to track it down to a set of underlaying assumptions that I simply don’t have. That may be the case here as well, but if so its on a far grander scale than any case I’ve seen before.

By: Vladimir Nesov

Vladimir Nesov — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 05:45:00 +0000

The semantics of values is intrinsically fact-dependent. If you are uploaded in the virtual world, where each time you eat an apple for breakfast, a child is automatically killed in the real world, and you don’t know it, you will make decisions that will lead to killed children. Does it change your values? In what sense it doesn’t?

By: softwareNerd

softwareNerd — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 02:19:13 +0000

“So is there anyone who thinks themselves more rational to argue about values than to argue about facts?”
I’m confused by this question. I thought you clarified your agreement with some comments above that arguments about values are arguments about the underlying facts or context on which those values are based.

In other words, arguments about values are arguments about facts. If so, how can they be more or less rational than arguments about facts…which they are anyway.

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 02:09:16 +0000

Eliezer, yes let’s accept impossible worlds as states. It is arguing about “facts” in the sense I defined in the post above, but it may also be “arguing about values” as well.

By: Eliezer Yudkowsky

Eliezer Yudkowsky — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 02:03:01 +0000

If you permit “state” to refer to impossible possible worlds, then I think we’re essentially in agreement about how to formalize this to the extent it can be formalized. But in what sense is this not “arguing about values”?

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 01:58:35 +0000

Eliezer, if you could have in principle anticipated that your “terminal” values and behavior would have changed in response to such arguments (and changed to something else in anticipation to other arguments), even if you did not actually bother to so anticipate, then your values seem clearly state-dependent values, where info is relevant to figuring out the values. This fits fine in the standard framework. If you could not anticipate such changes even in principle, but all your other behavior is as if you could, well I’d say you are as above except for a defect in your anticipation abilities.

By: Eliezer Yudkowsky

Eliezer Yudkowsky — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 01:39:40 +0000

Robin, humans not only seem to commonly argue about terminal values (things done for themselves and not their consequences), but also seem to occasionally update their professed beliefs about terminal values as the result of such arguments, and even, every now and then, change their actual behavior. Is this a malfunction of rationality? What is the truth that destroys it?

By: Mike

Mike — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 00:48:29 +0000

Have you read Schneier’s take on this or the article he sites?

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/risk_and_cultur.html

By: Lara Foster

Lara Foster — Wed, 02 Jul 2008 21:40:57 +0000

PK- I think we can safely describe ‘values’ as ‘general societal preferences,’ though I might be wrong. The problem with preferences arises when they involve the actions of *other* people, not just yourself. It’s fine to abandon the idea of values if you want to sit under a tree and meditate all day like Siddartha, but if you think that *other* people should be good to each other, then you will need to inflict your values upon them. You can tell them the facts, “Tying that child to a flagpole and dumping bleach down his pants was a very hurtful thing, which given our latest research seems like it might have damaged him for life, and generally nasty little boys like you are doing it in order to assert dominance, and truth be told, it seems to work- but society as a whole will be nicer if everyone stopped doing hurtful things like torturing the other boys in the school yard………”

Lets see how far this argument will get you.

Or, “What you did was evil and you are a very bad person for having done it, and Jesus will hate you and you will go to hell and burn in hellfire for all eternity if you don’t repent and promise never to do that again. Now go to your room- you are grounded for a week, daddy will be up there shortly with the switch.”

Not that I’m advocating that *we* should use the latter style of impressing values upon people. I don’t think it’s much different than what the Party of the Right was doing. But I am making a point that facts are not always able to resolve disputes/change behaviors…

Unless you are suggesting that the facts will add up to an objective morality… Plato’s “the Good”???

By: PK

PK — Wed, 02 Jul 2008 20:53:59 +0000

Values can be dissolved into facts. eg. “Chocolate is the best.” Can become “I like chocolate the most.” or “Most people prefer chocolate.” or whichever objective thing the value actually represents. If you don’t know what the value represents, ask why your brain produces the value in the first place. After this you only have to deal with facts.