Comments on: In Bias, Meta is Max

By: Hal Finney

Hal Finney — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 17:40:40 +0000

My problem with Eliezer’s notion of Traditional Rationality is whether most people are able to practice it. (This argument deserves a blog post but I will just summarize it here.) Which is going to be more practical and more successful for the average person, someone who is not a super-genius: to apply Bayesian style reasoning consistently, or to overcome their biases enough to accept the appropriate consensus? I would argue that we already have an instinct to accept consensus, and that this will improve most people’s accuracy over trying to think for themselves. The main problem IMO on issues where it matters (i.e. issues that would actually affect the typical person’s quality of life and which he has control over) is that people are sometimes not getting an accurate view of the informed consensus. Compared to this minor tweak, I see attempting to master Rationality as being far more difficult. Even Eliezer has had trouble with it.

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 11:08:28 +0000

Eliezer, yes given this serious meta-bias one is tempted to set aside all meta-arguments, but focusing on object-level issues has similarly serious problems with asymmetries in attention to object-level issues. For example, when we know our own personal arguments and evidence much better than others’ we naturally find them more persuasive. And when one view is dominant its arguments and evidence are much better known than those for other views. (Which is a way of, as you say, sneaking authority in around the sides.)

By: Eliezer Yudkowsky

Eliezer Yudkowsky — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 04:31:36 +0000

Traditional Rationality teaches us to focus on the object-level issues, not the people; it theoretically denigrates authority while sneaking it in around the sides.

I seriously wonder if this whole notion of “Who do you trust?” and “How biased are they?” ends up being weaker than Traditional Rationality’s injunction to focus on the object-level arguments. Maybe people just end up constructing elaborate arguments for who they are trusting, based on their object-level impressions of the issues – in the best-case scenario.

By: Hal Finney

Hal Finney — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 04:27:24 +0000

Sorry, I was pretty unclear. I took Roland to be suggesting that the resolution to his dilemma is that person B should generally trust his own judgement on the matter and disregard A’s opinion. I was trying to suggest that that principle would leave A with an incorrect belief, so it does not really help. We have a symmetrical situation in Roland’s dilemma, so we have to break the symmetry somehow, such as by reference to other people’s opinions.

By: Robin Hanson

Robin Hanson — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 03:28:18 +0000

What Joseph said. If you could identify some sloppiness and wishful thinking in astrologers, that would be only weak evidence against astrology. The fact that few experts have much good to say about astrology is much stronger evidence.

By: Joseph Buck

Joseph Buck — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 03:18:49 +0000

Roland, Robin wrote, “The fact that I can identify a particular bias in those I disagree with is only very weak evidence that I am more right than they.” While the presence of bias in an astrologist might be weak evidence of their wrongness, the majority opinion against them, and the overwhelming majority against them from people who have expertise in such matters, is strong evidence that they are wrong. If your only evidence against their belief was that they are biased, that might not be such a strong case. That is not the only evidence, however.

Hal, I don’t understand your dilemma. From where do you get the idea that people should “generally trust their own judgment on this matter”?

By: Hal Finney

Hal Finney — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 22:54:02 +0000

Roland, I can give you an even simpler dilemma:

Person A believes in astrology.

Should people generally trust their own judgement on this matter? If so, doesn’t that mean that person A is right?

By: John Maxwell

John Maxwell — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 22:24:58 +0000

“Without a way to overcome this bias, our other efforts are largely wasted.”

This understates the problem. Without a way to overcome this bias, overcomingbias.com is actually making people more biased than they were before.

By: Q the Enchanter

Q the Enchanter — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 20:10:46 +0000

“[B]eing more aware of biases makes us more willing to assume that others’ biases, and not ours, are responsible for our disagreement…”

Okay, sure, maybe other people are biased in this way. But not me.

By: Roland

Roland — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 19:09:02 +0000

Person A believes in astrology.

Person B believes that astrology is bullshit based on his understanding of science and human biases.

After reading your article should B reconsider his point of view and assume that he is probably as wrong as A?