Comments on: Science Isn’t Strict Enough

By: Dihymo

Dihymo — Sun, 01 Jun 2008 22:48:02 +0000

A rising sun might increase the data pointing to the provability that it will rise tomorrow, but the probability remains the same.

The discovery that the Earth rotates, easily done by studying the stars from two different places, would dramatically send the probability to 100% because the provability went there first.

So if you want to know about the sun rise you’ll have to study the stars first. At night. It’s like trying to figure out why ice melts without having any source of heat.

Stop with the dialectics. Try three not two not one and not zero.

By: Unknown

Unknown — Wed, 21 May 2008 11:46:46 +0000

Tim, I am very familiar with the topic.

So do you think that observing the sun rise today does not increase the probability that it will rise tomorrow?

(One warning in advance: unless you say that you are 100% certain that the sun rises by chance, your inductive skepticism can be logically demonstrated to be false.)

By: Tim Tyler

Tim Tyler — Wed, 21 May 2008 08:51:11 +0000

Re: “how is it justified to be 100% certain that everything is random”. That is not what inductive sceptics think. They think that using induction to understand the world has no logical basis (and they are perfectly right about that). That does not mean that the world is without pattern or meaning – just that using induction in an attempt to extract the patterns is not justifiable behaviour. If you want to put induction in your toolbox, then fine, but you can’t pretend that this behaviour has a coherent justification – because you have no counter-argument to a sceptic who says it should be left out.

Hume’s problem of induction is basic philosophy of science material – and you ought to know about it if you are discussing this kind of material. Not familiar with the topic? Don’t ask here – instead, hit the library, there is a lot of existing material on the subject.

By: Unknown

Unknown — Wed, 21 May 2008 08:07:28 +0000

Tim: contrary to experience or not, how is it justified to be 100% certain that everything is random?

If you are not 100% certain of this, then induction can be justified, and without any circularity.

By: Tim Tyler

Tim Tyler — Wed, 21 May 2008 07:58:18 +0000

Re: “Since all reasoning is inductive, it would have a little consistency problem.” No: see deductive reasoning.
Re: “Hume’s complaint is that there is uncertainty and doubt in all conclusions” – Hume’s problem of induction is only concerned with induction.
Re: Acceptance of induction among philosophers: Hume’s point was not that induction was common or mistaken – but that it is not rational, it lacks justification that would convince a sceptical rational agent.
Re: “How does a position merit the title “skeptical” when it maintains an infinite certainty of something completely contrary to experience” – the idea that the past cannot predict the future is not contrary to experience. It conflicts with evolutionary biology – but good luck with convincing an inductive sceptic that evolutionary biology is correct – the whole enterprise is founded on induction.

By: Unknown

Unknown — Wed, 21 May 2008 03:13:17 +0000

Inductive skepticism, as I understand it, is Hume’s position that observing the sun rise today does not increase the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow.

This would be true only on the assumption that there is a 100% chance that whether or not the sun rises is completely random. If there is at least a one in a billion chance that the sun rises according to rule, then observing the sun rise once will increase the probability that it will rise next time.

How does a position merit the title “skeptical” when it maintains an infinite certainty of something completely contrary to experience, namely that everything is totally random?

By: poke

poke — Tue, 20 May 2008 23:00:03 +0000

Hume defends two separate theses, inductive fallibilism and inductive skepticism, at different points in his work. Inductive fallibilism, that inductive arguments are inherently fallible, is widely accepted in philosophy. Inductive skepticism, that induction can never be justified, is not. Inductive probabilism, that induction gives us probabilities, is a position that accepts inductive fallibilism. David Stove's Scientific Irrationalism gives a good account of why inductive fallibilism succeeds where inductive skepticism fails. He also hammers on the important point that the problem of induction is a logical thesis and not a historical thesis; it's a problem of justifying induction and not a description of induction. Induction is still possible even if you can't justify it. The problem of induction is also only a problem if you accept Hume's premises (big-E Empiricism) and, obviously, the methodology of philosophy to begin with.

By: Caledonian

Caledonian — Tue, 20 May 2008 22:26:09 +0000

Since all reasoning is inductive, it would have a little consistency problem.

By: Tim Tyler

Tim Tyler — Tue, 20 May 2008 20:35:49 +0000

Here’s how Binmore puts it:

“Someone who acts as if Bayesianism were correct will be said to be a Bayesianite.

It is important to distinguish a Bayesian like myself—someone convinced by Savage’s arguments that Bayesian decision theory makes sense in small worlds—from a Bayesianite. In particular, a Bayesian need not join the more extreme Bayesianites in proceeding as though:

* All worlds are small.
* Rationality endows agents with prior probabilities.
* Rational learning consists simply in using Bayes’ rule to convert a set of prior probabilities into posterior probabilities after registering some new data.

Bayesianites are often understandably reluctant to make an explicit commitment to these principles when they are stated so baldly, because it then becomes evident that they are implicitly claiming that David Hume was wrong to argue that the principle of scientific induction cannot be justified by rational argument.”

- http://www.carloalberto.org/files/binmore.pdf

Re: “A totally rational agent who denied the validity of induction would be unable to think.”

No, they would be a perfectly rational agent, quite capable of logical thought.

By: Caledonian

Caledonian — Tue, 20 May 2008 20:31:08 +0000

A totally rational agent who denied the validity of induction would be unable to think.

The Hume’s complaint is that there is uncertainty and doubt in all conclusions. That’s a “problem” in precisely the same way that Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems are a “problem” for our attempts to make a consistent and complete model of mathematics.