Exactly. And I don’t think it’s somehow more honest to ignore relevant data about *an individual* in favor of applying a stereotype.

Stereotyping might be an acceptable tool in some cases (for instance, the case in which a large man is running toward you wielding a knife — you really don’t want to be giving him the benefit of the doubt at that point!) but it is a mistake to think that stereotypes somehow have priveleged access to truth. Expediency and utilitarian value in a survival situation is not the same thing as greater coherence with reality.

In some cases, groups of people are stereotyped inaccurately because they’re in a position of lesser power than another group and because the group-in-power has a vested interest (though not necessarily one even known to all group members) in stereotyping an outgroup.

Slavery would be an example of this; it was important, for instance, to maintain the lie that people belonging to the “slave race” were intellectually inferior or not really people at all. If we were having this discussion pre Civil War, would someone making a sincere effort to overcome bias really suggest that we should, by default, believe that members of an enslaved race really were inferior?

Stereotyping as a habit most certainly compels people to ignore relevant information about individuals *and* groups when people insist on holding onto obsolete and/or tainted information — which is why we have things like the Civil Rights movement, feminism, and the men’s movement.

“how can it be just to ignore relevant information about a person?”

Well I don’t suppose it is; but I don’t think my position is particularly controversial. A stereotype does not concern a person, it concerns a group. (I am assuming that we agree that by stereotype we mean a general observation applied to a definable group that is true given some statisical qualification)

Such an observation might be useful in some context (for example consideration of some general policy) but it might be entirely inappropriate in another context. It is almost impossible to discuss this in the abstract: as so often, it all depends on the numbers and the specific circumstances. There is a very strong correlation between being male and having testicles. I am a male, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that I have testicles, but there might still be circumstances (perhaps best left to the imagination) in which it was appropriate to make a specific enquiry as to the facts in my case. My gender also makes me more likely to be a violent criminal. If I was on trial for battering my fishmonger, this would be a revelant, but unjust, consideration at my trial because the other facts (notably whether I committed the offence or not) would be overwhelmingly more relevant.

A general observation may be true, but once you have narrowed your field of observation to a specific individual there becomes available much better information upon which to base a conclusion – at which point the stereotype is unlikely to assist in the objective assessment of that information, and in practice, seems to have the opposite effect.

http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/getArticle.cfm?id=2076

The author of this article recommends, “…that we test our interpretations for bias by peeling off the labels, as I’ve done here. If our interpretations make little sense, then our science is biased.”

If “labels” are similar in this context to “stereotypes”, then this article could be relevant to this discussion. When it comes to experimental science, stereotyping of groups of people (according to psychological diagnosis and gender in this case) can influence the interpretation of results in ways that can be detrimental to a clearer scientific understanding of a given phenomenon.

You might suggest that peeling off the labels, as the aforementioned author suggests, is actually a form of ignoring relevant information — however, I would disagree that this is necessarily the case, since one cannot entirely discount the chance that leaving the labels applied could lead to a misinterpretation of the results (because at least some of the information associated with a given label could be obsolete). Perhaps ideally, scientists should be able to evaluate the data in full knowledge of what the applicable stereotyping labels suggest, but at the same time understand that the labels could be misleading them and interpret accordingly. But perhaps that’s what the initial post was suggesting in the first place.

Long established and valuable principles such as presumption of innocence and equality under the law are based on the idea that an individual, possessed of free will, should be given the benefit of the doubt.

This does not in any way imply that the formulation or observation of stereotypes is not useful.

In any case, Robin’s point is that the overconfidence bias is only exacerbated by higher self-confidence. (This has been established by studies.) There are no biases that are decreased by higher self-confidence.

“Vigorous thinking would lead people to consider other viewpoints, and even question themselves. This will eventually lead to a more accurate set of assumptions”

It’s not clear that people can consistently increase the accuracy of their set of assumptions by considering other viewpoints.

“Taking your reply at face value, the more bias free I become, the less confident I would have to be.”

It looks like you might be conflating self-confidence with credulity. “Less confident” might mean “more skeptical”, or “more humble”. I do think that, on the balance, biases tend to dispose people towards higher belief in propositions rather than lower, but I don’t think it follows at all that less biased = more humble. If anything, it would be the opposite.