Well, from the vantage point of a particular moral framework, humans can have biases regarding particular normative claims. But since there’s widespread variance in people’s moral belief systems on normative issues, especially when you consider detailed and complicated issues like work-family balance, there’s little hope of being able to intersubjectively determine bias in claims of that type, since there’s no agreed-upon standard against which to measure bias in them. So Guy’s distinction is relevant and worth consideration.

To focus on this particular example, thinking about it from a normative perspective raises, I think, very different questions from questions about the statistics of regret. For instance, our relation to our family involves special moral duties and concerns. And whether it was acceptable (or worthwhile) to neglect these duties/concerns for the sake of professional success may depend on whether one is, in fact, ultimately successful, and in what way (this question being the immediate topic of Bernard Williams’s ‘Moral Luck’).

Well, from the vantage of a particular moral framework, normative claims can be biased. But since there’s widespread variance in people’s moral belief systems on normative issues involving work-family balance, there’s little hope of being able to intersubjectively determine bias in normative claims, since there’s no agreed-upon standard against which to measure bias in normative claims.

I’m not clear why you look to draw our attention to whether these are “empirical,” “objective,” or “normative” claims. Yes it is harder to find support (evidence or analysis) regarding some kinds of claims, and various particular evidence support some claims more than others. But all of these kinds of claims can be in error, and so there can be biases about them. Bias is just avoidable systematic error.